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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following are the issues presented for review, including the applicable 
standard of review for each as well as the citation to the record where the issue was 
preserved below: 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court correctly rule that the Brighton Title failed to 
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where Brighton Title 
did not seek to controvert Cooper's statement of undisputed facts? A trial court's 
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed 
de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was 
preserved. (R. 712-729). 
Issue No. 2: Did the Court rule correctly Cooper was entitled to judgment against 
Brighton Title as a matter of law? A trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil 
procedure present a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth 
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 469-577). 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by 
failing to provide any analysis or reasoning in granting Cooper summary judgment? This 
issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 
2004 UT 102, U 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Whether a trial court abused its discretion is 
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, \ 7, 
141 P.3d 629. This issue was preserved. (R. 727). 
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Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err as a matter of law ixji concluding Brighton Title 
was bound by the terms of a real estate purchase contract to which it was not a party? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth 
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 483-85). 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding Brighton Title 
owed any fiduciary duty to Cooper? This issue presents a question of law which is 
reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, J| 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This 
issue was preserved. (R. 482-83). 
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court err in concluding the lltah Department of 
Insurance Bulletin did not have the force of law and cannot be used to excuse Brighton 
Title's conduct? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. 
Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1241 This issue was preserved. 
(R. 480-82). 
Issue No. 7: Did the trial court err as a matter of law ih signing the ruling 
prepared by counsel for Cooper where the minute entry instructed counsel to only prepare 
an order? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. 
Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. This is^ue was preserved. (R. 742-
45). 
Issue No. 8: Did the trial court correctly rule Brightori Title did not have standing 
to challenge an award of attorney fees where that award was jnot entered against 
Appellant? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. 
Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. This iskie was preserved. (R. 
769). 
Issue No., 9: Did the trial court correctly conclude Brighton Title breached its 
contractual obligations to Cooper where Cooper first breached the contract by 
representing it was the fee title owner of the property when it was not? This issue 
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 
UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 478-80). 
Issue No. 10: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding the seller of 
real property did not have to be on title at all during the executory period of a contract? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth 
VilL, 2004 UT 102, \ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved (R. 478-80). 
Issue No. 11: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding Brighton 
Title breached its duties to Cooper where the transaction was an illegal flip? This issue 
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 
UT 102,1| 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 480-81). 
Issue No. 12: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in ruling a title company 
may act as an escrow agent where they are unable to insure the transaction because one of 
the parties' is not on title to the property? This issue presents a question of law which is 
reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, U 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This 
issue was preserved. (R. 483). 
Issue No. 13: Did the trial court err when it concluded there were no genuine 
issues of material fact which precluded the grant of summary judgment? This issue 
presents a question of fact which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to 
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the district court. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ^  f, 156 P.3d 175. This 
issue is preserved. (R. 744). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCE, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions which govern thijs action. However, the 
applicable law includes Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated, Utah Department of 
Insurance Bulletins 2007-1 and 2007-5, all of which are attached in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a split closing flip transaction wherein the Appellee 
("Cooper") intended to use the funds from defendant, Deseret Sky ("Deseret Sky") to 
complete their purchase of the property from the original owner of the real property. 
Cooper retained the services of Metro National Title to handld its portion of the split 
closing. Deseret Sky retained the services of Appellant ("Brighton Title") to handle its 
side of the split closing. Deseret Sky executed a real estate piirchase contract ("REPC") 
agreeing to purchase the property from Cooper. At the time trie REPC was executed, 
Cooper had only a contractual right to purchase the property, and was not in title. 
However, at the time the REPC was executed by Cooper, it represented it had fee title to 
the property. 
The REPC required an earnest money deposit of $100j000 which became non-
refundable at the conclusion of the due diligence period. Brighton Title received the 
initial earnest money deposit from Deseret Sky. By May 31, 
became aware Cooper did not hold fee title to the property. Upon this discovery 
2007, Brighton Title 
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Brighton Title had discussions with its underwriter, Stewart Title, who infonned Brighton 
Title it would not insure the transaction. Further, Stewart Title informed Brighton Title 
that based on the nature of the closing, it should return the earnest money to Deseret Sky 
and refuse to participate in the transaction as structured, regardless of what the REPC 
stated. On June 1, 2007, Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper was not on 
title. 
On the date Deseret Sky's real estate agent Angela Gowan received the Due 
Diligence from Cooper, she spoke with Deseret Sky who wanted Cooper to provide some 
kind of assurance that the original seller was aware of the transaction between Cooper 
and Deseret Sky. Brighton Title contacted Metro National Title and informed it that 
Brighton Title would not insure the transaction unless Cooper provided a full assignment 
of its interest in the Hansen Contract to Deseret Sky or alternatively Cooper provided 
assurances that it would close the Hansen Contract with its own independent funds to 
insure that it was not a flip transaction. 
Cooper at all times intended to use a portion of the sale proceeds from the sale of 
the property to Deseret Sky to complete its purchase of the property from Hansen. A 
principal in Brighton Title, Jeff Gorringe, testified when the Utah Insurance Department 
issued Bulletin 2007-1, he contacted a market conduct investigator with the Insurance 
Department for clarification of the Bulletin. Gorringe was informed if a title/escrow 
agency performed such a transaction and was caught, the Insurance Department would 
take action against their license. 
In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies become non-refundable on June 
12 
8, 2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Ski. The parties 
contemplated a "split closing" wherein Brighton Title was to handle the closing for the 
buyer, Deseret Sky, issuing a lender's insurance policy, and Metro National Title was to 
handle the seller's closing for Cooper, issuing an owner's insurance policy. However, the 
REPC did not contain a split closing addendum. Deseret Sky iieither canceled the REPC 
by providing written notice to Cooper nor delivered a written objection to Cooper 
regarding Deseret Sky's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence Deadline. 
After the expiration of the Due Diligence period, on June 11, 2007, Deseret Sky sent a 
letter (back dated to June 8, 2007) to Robert Cooper terminating the REPC and 
instructing Brighton Title to "return all earnest money deposits to the Buyer." 
On June 12 of 2007, after having previously informed Metro National Title that 
Deseret Sky would not close absent either an assignment of the Hansen contract or other 
assurances, Brighton Title informed Cooper that Brighton Tit e was going to release the 
earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky. The money was thereafter returned to 
Deseret Sky. The sole reason Brighton returned the earnest nkmey to Deseret Sky was 
because its underwriter, Stewart Title believed the transaction was a flip and it would not 
insure the transaction, based on the express language of the l|tah Department of 
Insurance Bulletin 2007-1. As a result of Deseret Sky's refusal to complete the 
transaction because Cooper was not on title and it could not be insured, no sale was 
transacted and Cooper was unable to purchase the Property ujider the Hansen Contract. 
At no time has Cooper ever been on title to the subject property. 
Cooper sued Deseret Sky and Brighton Title, seeking iquidated damages in the 
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total amount of $200,000.00, of which $100,000.00 represented the initial earnest money 
deposited with Brighton Title. Following discovery, the parties moved for summary 
judgment against one another. Without a hearing, the Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Cooper. Brighton Title appeals from that judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Procedural Facts 
1. Cooper commenced this action on the September 14, 2007. (R. 1-23). 
2. Brighton Title answered the complaint on October 9, 2007. (R. 32-42). 
3. The parties conducted discovery. 
4. On October 20, 2008, Cooper filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 195-
468). 
5. On November 6, 2008, Brighton Title filed its counter motion for summary 
judgment, together with a memorandum in opposition to the Cooper's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Brighton Title's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R.469-577). 
6. On November 17, 2008, Cooper filed its memorandum in opposition to Brighton 
Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 685-696). 
7. On November 24, 2008, Brighton Title filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 697-703). 
8. On January 7, 2009, the Court entered the following minute entry, which stated 
verbatim: 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment and Defendant Brighton Title 
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Company's counter-motion for summary judgment. Based upon a 
review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court rules as follows: 
1. The request for hearing is denied. Th£ Court has reviewed the 
pleadings filed in this matter, and orall argument, would not be of 
assistance in ruling. | 
2. The Plaintiffs motion for summary jiidgment is granted. 
Defendant Deseret Sky has not responded to Plaintiffs motion. 
Defendant Brighton Title Company's responsive memorandum 
failed to comply with the requirement^ of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes 
that the Plaintiffs statement of undisputed facts is 
incontroverted, and that there is no g$nuinue issue of material 
fact in dispute. Additionally, based uJ3on the memoranda filed, 
the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment against both defendants, 
jointly and severally; as to Deseret Sky Development, for the entire 
amount of liquidated damages and as to Brighton Title Company, for 
the $ 100,000 returned to Deseret Sky. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is requested p prepare an order 
consistent with this ruling. (R. 707-708)1 
9. On January 13, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Motion ror Clarification and 
Reconsideration of Court's Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment. (R. 710-729). 
10. On January 22, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection to Cooper's draft 
Judgment. (R. 739-741). 
11. On January 2, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection |to Cooper's Draft of Ruling 
on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Co's 
Countermotion for Summary Judgment. (R. 742-745). 
12. On January 26, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection to Affidavit of Attorney 
Fees and Costs. (R. 746-750). 
13. On February 20, 2009, the Court entered its Minute Entry-Court's Clarification of 
Prior Ruling on Summary Judgment. (R. 783-788). 
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14. On March 3, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 792-793). 
15. On March 16, 2009, the Court signed the Cooper's Proposed Ruling and 
Judgment. (R. 802-831). 
B. Factual History 
16. Cooper Enterprises, P.C. ("Cooper") is a Utah professional corporation. (R 1, 32, 
230). 
17. Deseret Sky Development, LLC ("Deseret Sky"), is a Utah limited liability 
company. (R. 1,32,43 230). 
18. Brighton Title Company, LLC ("Brighton Title") is a Utah limited liability 
company. (R. 2, 32, 44, 230). 
19. The real property which is the subject hereof is located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and known generally as Danish Heights Estates PUD or 2745 East Creek Road, 
Cottonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 2, 33, 44, 230). 
20. By Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land, with offer reference date of May 25, 
2007, as modified by Addenda Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (the "REPC"), Cooper agreed to sell and 
Deseret Sky agreed to by the Property. (R. 2, 44, 198, 231). 
21. At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper was not on title to the property but 
had the property under contract to purchase from WH Hansen, LLC. (R. 44, 231, 488-
501). 
22. At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper represented in the REPC that it 
had fee title to the property. (R. 473, 534). 
23. Angela Gowan acted as real estate agent for Deseret Sky with respect to the 
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transaction with Cooper. (R. 231,473). 
24. On or about May 31, 2007, Brighton Title became awaile Cooper was not in title to 
the Property. (R. 232,473). 
25. On June 1, 2007 Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper was not in title. 
(R. 473, 512). 
26. Brighton Title discussed the transaction with Stewart Title, its underwriter, who 
informed Brighton Title it would not insure the transaction anil based on the nature of the 
closing, it should return the earnest money to Deseret Sky and refuse to participate in the 
transaction as structured. (R. 518, 566, 571-573). 
27. On or about June 1, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper a copy of the 
Hansen Contract. (R. 232,473,488-501). 
28. On the date Ms. Gowans received the Due Diligence fiiom Cooper, she spoke with 
Deseret Sky who wanted Cooper to provide some kind of assurance Hansen was aware of 
the transaction between Cooper and Deseret Sky. (R. 473, 506-07). 
29. Brighton Title contacted Metro National Title and informed it Brighton Title 
would not insure the transaction unless Cooper provided a full assignment of its interest 
in the Hansen Contract to Deseret Sky or alternatively Coopei: provided assurances it 
would close the Hansen Contract with its own independent ftjnds to insure that it was not 
an illegal flip transaction. (R. 473-74, 521). 
30. Cooper at all times intended to use a portion of the salb proceeds from the sale of 
the property to Deseret Sky to complete its purchase of the property from Hansen. (R. 
551-52). 
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31. Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title testified when the Utah Insurance Department 
issued Bulletin 2007-1, he contacted Jeri Jones, a market conduct investigator with the 
Insurance Department for clarification of the Bulletin and was informed if a title/escrow 
agency performed such a transaction and was caught, the Insurance Department would 
take action against their license. (R. 474,526-28, 542-45). 
32. Ms. Gowans did not talk to Brighton Title about the Hansen Contract until after 
the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky had been voided. (R. 474). 
33. The REPC, paragraph 2(a) reflected an initial earnest money deposit of One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) and provided: 'THIS DEPOSIT MAY 
BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE". (R. 232,474,531-41). 
34. Paragraph 2 of the Addendum No. 1 to REPC provides: 
2) Earnest Money to be deposited with Brighton Title Company upon 
acceptance. An additional $100,000 earnest money to be deposited with 
Brighton Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence deadline. Total of 
$200,000 shall [be] non-refundable after June 8, 2007. 
(R. 232,474-75, 531-41). 
35. Addendum No. 2 Of the REPC provides: 
1. REPC, Section 2(d) $100,000 additional earnest money due on June 8, 
2007 by 5:00 p.m. M D T . . . 
6. [sic] $100,000 Earnest Money to be non-refundable but applicable and 
immediately released to seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MDT. 
6. An addition $100,000 Earnest Money will be deposited on June 8, 2007 by 
5:00 p.m. MDT which is non-refundable but applicable and immediately 
released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MDT. 
(R. 232-33, 475, 531-41). 
36. Addenuin No. 3 provides: 
4) All earnest monies shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and shall 
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be released to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 jat 5:00 p.m. MST . 
(R. 233,475, 531-41). 
37. Brighton Title accepted the initial $100,000 earnest molney from Deseret Sky in 
escrow, in its capacity as Deseret Sky's escrow agent. (R. 233, 475, 513-14, 516). 
38. The parties contemplated a "split closing" wherein Brighton Title was to handle 
the closing for the buyer, Deseret Sky, issuing a lender's insurance policy, and Metro 
National Title was to handle the seller's closing for Cooper, issuing an owner's insurance 
policy. (R. 475,515,531-541). 
39. The REPC did not contain a split closing addendum. (% 475, 531-41, 546-48). 
40. The REPC provides in paragraph 16: 
16. DEFAULT: If Buyer defaults, Seller may $lect to . . . retain the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, j . . 
(R. 234-35,476,531-41). 
41. Deseret Sky did not directly cancel nor object to the REPC by June 8, 2007, other 
than through Brighton Title who communicated to Metro National Title prior to the June 
8, 2007 that absent an assignment of the Hansen Contract or q>ther assurances, Deseret 
Sky would not close the transaction. (R. 235, 476). 
42. The June 8, 2007 deadline for Deseret Sky to deposit an additional $100,000 with 
Brighton Title came and went without any additional funds being deposited, but also 
without any assignment or assurances from Cooper. (R. 235 476, 516). 
43. On June 8, 2007, Deseret Sky telephoned Jeff Gorringe at Brighton Title and 
informed them not to distribute the earnest money funds. (R. 
44. Deseret Sky sent a letter instructing Brighton Title to ' 
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476,519). 
return all earnest money 
deposits to Buyer." (R. 235,476). 
45. On June 12, 2007, Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Cooper that Brighton 
Title was going to release the earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky. (R. 235-36, 
476, 522-23). 
46. The sole reason Brighton Title returned the earnest money to Deseret Sky was 
because its underwriter, Stewart Title believed the transaction was a flip and it would not 
insure the transaction. (R. 476, 529). 
47. None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro National Title. (R. 236, 
477,517,523-25). 
48. Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title testified if he turned the earnest money over to 
Metro National Title, because Cooper was not on title to the property, he could not 
provide any protection to Deseret Sky regarding any claim Deseret Sky may have had to 
the property. (R. 477,530). 
49. Because Cooper relied on funds from the sale of the Property to Deseret Sky to 
fund Cooper's purchase, Cooper was unable to purchase the Property under the Hansen 
Contract. (R. 237,477). 
50. To date, Cooper has never acquired title to the Property. (R. 477, 507-508). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This case in large measure speaks to the general issue of the conflicting duties 
imposed by statutes, rules of conduct governing a particular industry, and regulatory 
agency interpretations. In the specific context of this case, it competes the general duties 
owed by a title agency with statutory prohibitions and insurance department policies 
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which may directly result in licensing sanctions. However, on a broader view, the same 
problems can arise in other contexts, including but not limited to the practice of law. 
As argued herein, there are a number of reasons this Co^rt should reverse the trial 
court's decision. There are issues of fact which precluded both parties from being 
granted summary judgment. Cooper was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This Court should clarify the obligations of a responding party under Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the responding party [does not controvert the 
facts as stated but rather enlarges upon those facts adding its olwn additional facts. 
i 
This Court should clarify the duties of a trial court jud^e when ruling upon a 
motion for summary judgment. Must the Court provide analysis and reasoning for its 
decision, or may it simply state, "Motion granted" leaving to the whim of the successful 
party to devine the Court's reasoning? In addition, where the |Minute Entry constitutes 
the Ruling of the Court, the Court abuses its discretion when it signs a parties' drafted 
Ruling where the party was never instructed to prepare one. 
Narrowing the focus to this particular case, a title company should not be bound to 
the terms of a contract to which it is not a party nor to which it has consented. The 
parties cannot impose a duty upon a party who never consents thereto. 
Where the parties contemplate the employment of separate title companies acting 
as insurers and escrow agents, with each employing their owij, the title company owes a 
fiduciary duty only to the party by whom it was engaged. Thfe general duty of a joint 
fiduciary duty simply should not apply. 
Regardless of whether the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin as the actual 
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force of law, it has the practical force of law because of the sanctions which may be 
imposed for it violation. As such, a title company acting as insurer and escrow agent 
must comply with the Bulletin or face sanctions. Liability cannot be rested upon a good 
faith compliance with the Insurance Department's mandates. 
When the Court awarded attorney fees albeit not against Brighton Title, Brighton 
Title objected. The Court ruled it did not have standing. Brighton Title believes that for 
any issue before the Court, a defendant party has standing to object. This Court should 
clarify when a defendant in an action has no standing to challenge any part of the 
proceedings because the claims do not go directly against that party. 
Cooper was not in title to the property and to this date has never been in title to the 
property. However, it expressly represented in the REPC it was the fee title holder of the 
property. Brighton Title believes it cannot be held liable for its alleged breach of contract 
where Cooper breached first by affirmatively misrepresenting its state of ownership in the 
property. While a seller does not have to hold title during the entire executory period, 
liability for breach by a buyer cannot be rested upon an impossibility to acquire that title 
absent the purchase money from the subsequent purchaser. Further, because the 
transaction was an illegal flip in violation of the good funds statute, Brighton Title was 
precluded as a matter of law from participating in the transaction. 
Finally, a title company, acting as escrow agent and insurer is precluded by law 
from participating in transactions it cannot insure. Because Cooper was not on title and 
Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, its participation was illegal. Brighton 
Title had no choice but to return the funds to Deseret Sky. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE WERE BOTH GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND COOPER 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The trial court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment to 
Cooper because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not 
entitled to judgment as matter of law. A trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil 
procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth 
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. Further, the grant of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the district court. Bluffdale City v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 25, j[ 5, 156 P.3d 175. Further, when faced with a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court must view all facts including all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party. Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, 
Tf 7, 184 P.3d 610. Because there were genuine issues of material fact, and because 
Cooper is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Coi^ rt must reverse the trial 
court. 
In the instant action, Brighton Title did not dispute the facts alleged by Cooper. 
It did however present additional facts which should have created a genuine issue of 
material fact which should have precluded the grant of summary judgment. Brighton 
Title submitted the Hansen Contract which revealed that Cooper was not on title to the 
property. (R. 488-501), creating a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
23 
Cooper had any interest in the property and moreover an interest which gave rise to the 
right to sell the property to Deseret Sky. 
Brighton Title submitted the affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, former Assistant 
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department who explained the nature of Insurance 
Department Bulletins and the sanctions or enforcement which can spring from the 
violations of said bulletins. (R. 560-563). Mr. Stevens averred it was industry standard 
and practice to comply with the bulletins. As such, the bulletins were treated as having 
the force of law in industry practice. 
In addition, Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Jeff Gorringe who stated 
on June 1, 2008, he informed Metro National Title that Deseret Sky would not close on 
the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 566-569). This constituted an 
objection before the June 8, 2008. Gorringe informed Metro National Title unless 
Cooper provided a full assignment of the Hansen contract or provided assurances Cooper 
would close the transaction with its own funds, Brighton Title would not participate in 
this illegal flip transaction. (R. 566-567). Cooper provided no evidence that it forwarded 
to Brighton Title either an assignment of the Hansen contract or it provided assurances it 
could close the transaction with its own funds. 
Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Matt Sager the underwriting counsel for 
Stewart Guaranty Company (R. 570-574). He stated he specifically reviewed the 
transaction and found it to be an illegal flip transaction. (R. 572). 
Cooper asserted a contractual claim in the Property which it believed provided the 
legal basis to sell the Property. (R. 532-541). It did not provide any evidence to the 
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Court of a present ability to obtain title prior to the closing of the Deseret Sky sale. Thus, 
there was a question of fact concerning whether Cooper had ahy practical ability to obtain 
title during the executory period without violating Utah law. "jThis alone precluded the 
grant of summary judgment. 
While Brighton did not dispute the factual allegations presented by Cooper, it did 
present additional facts which created a genuine issue of material fact which precluded 
the grant of summary judgment. Based on these factual disputes, this Court must reverse 
the trial court. In addition, as discussed more fully below, evto in the absence of genuine 
issues of material fact, Cooper was not entitled to judgment a$ a matter of law. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW THE INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT'S BULLETINS 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Brighton Title was not bound 
to follow the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletins. This i^sue presents a question of 
law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, f 17, 104 P.3d 
1242. While this issue focuses on the specific facts and bulletins at issue in the present 
action, the results have far reaching ramifications, including for those engaged in the 
practice of law. Brighton Title believes the trial court erred ajs a matter of law in 
concluding both that Brighton Title was not obligated to comply with the Bulletins and its 
compliance therewith did not excuse its performance under the terms of the REPC. 
Utah has adopted the good funds statute, as set forth irk Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, this statutejrequires in part that funds 
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be cleared before they can disbursed. On or about January 30, 2007, D. Kent Michie, 
Utah Insurance Commissioner, issued Bulletin 2007-1, thereby interpreting the above 
referenced statute as it relates to prohibited escrow settlement closings. (R. 543). 
Bulletin 2007-1 states: 
Due to the large number of "land flip" transaction and use by real estate agents of 
the Simultaneous Closing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract (a copy of 
which is attached), and due to the fact that "flipping" real estate often involves 
fraud, the Utah Insurance Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission 
have determined the following structure to be the only permitted method of acting 
as escrowr wherein the same parcel of property is purchased and then immediately 
sold. 
The transactions effected by this bulletin are those transactions in which Seller 
"A" contract with Buyer "B" to sell a parcel of property. Buyer "B" then contracts 
with Buyer UC" to sell the same parcel of property. Buyer "B" anticipates 
acquiring the parcel and selling the parcel at or near the same time. 
The transaction between Seller "A" and Buyer "B" must close independently from 
the transaction between Buyer "B" and Buyer "C". The funds deposited by Buyer 
"C" may not be used to fund the closing between Seller "A" and Buyer "B". 
Buyer UB" must provide funds independent of funds generated by Buyer "C". 
A policy of title insurance must be issued in the Seller "A" to Buyer "B" 
transaction and in Buyer "B" to Buyer "C" transaction. Each real estate 
transaction must stand on its own. Buyer "B" must close with Buyer "B's" own 
good fund and record so that Buyer "B" is in title prior to the second transaction 
closing and recording. 
The above structure insures compliance with 31 A-23a-406 and R590-153-5. 
(R. 543, emphasis supplied). 1 As if the verbal explanation were not sufficient, the 
Bulletin includes a graphic depiction of flips which are and are not permitted. (R. 545). 
The instant transaction expressly and squarely fits within the description of flip 
transactions which are not permitted. In the instant case, Cooper entered into a contract 
l R590-153-5 has been repealed and renumbered R592-6-1 etseq. References throughout 
this brief will continue to refer to the old citation. 
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to purchase the Property from Hansen. (R. 488-502). Thereafter, without closing on 
title, Cooper entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract to sill the property to Deseret 
Sky. (R. 2, 198, 231, 280-289). However, Cooper at all times intended to use part of the 
sale proceeds received from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the property from 
Hansen. (R. 551-52). As such, the transaction was expressly; a flip which the 
Department of Insurance stated was prohibited by Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) as interpreted by the Department in Bulletin 2007-1. 
Before the trial court, Cooper made the disingenuous; argument that the Bulletin 
is essentially advisory, lacking any force of law. This argument is simply without merit. 
First, courts regularly defer to agency interpretation of the statutes they are charged with 
administering. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 
S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (stating agency interpretation "entitled to 
a presumption of regularity"). Admittedly, while the Court need not give deference to the 
interpretative Bulletin, those in the industry must do so or facp the peril of their conduct. 
Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d 1238, 1306 (Utah App. 1997). 
With the foregoing being said, the title and escrow indiistry licensees who are 
subject to enforcement actions by the Department, as well as ihe Department itself, treat 
the Bulletin as though it had the force of law. As set forth in jhe affidavit of Richard 
Peter Stevens, former Assistant Commissioner for the Department of Insurance, a 
violation of the statute as interpreted in the Bulletin can result in enforcement and 
sanctions. (R. 561-563). In addition, it is the practice in the industry to comply with the 
interpretations set forth in all such Bulletins. (R. 564-569, 5J71-573). In short, the 
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industry treats the Utah Insurance Department Bulletins as having the force of law. 
The circumstance is akin to many other situations where rules of professional 
conduct govern a particular industry. By way of example, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct govern the practice of law. These rules are explained and applied in ethics 
advisory opinions. In In re: McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 334 (Utah 1997), the Court instructs a 
judge to consult ethics advisory opinions when considering what he should or should not do with 
respect to giving opinion testimony in a proceeding in another court. Utah is not alone in 
referring to ethics advisory opinions as providing a basis for determining what is or is not 
permissible conduct. See e.g. Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual, 788 So. 2d 1140, 1145 
(La. 5/15/01); Petition of Wiley, 671 A.2d 308, 310 (R.I. 1996); and State v. Jones, 726 
S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1987)(where the Court held that ethics advisory opinions while 
persuasive do not have the force of law and are not binding on the Court). Regardless of 
whether they have the force of law, by the industry they are treated as having such. A 
practitioner is on notice that if an ethics advisory opinion proscribes particular conduct, a 
violation of that opinion will result in censure. 
In the instant case, Brighton Title was faced with an express Department of 
Insurance Bulletin which said the proposed transaction violated Utah law. Brighton Title 
recognized the transaction as a violation of Utah's good funds statute and the 
interpretative Bulletin 2007-1. As such, it could do nothing but withdraw from the 
transaction and refund the money to its depositor, Deseret Sky Development. 
Compliance with a Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin (or an ethics advisory 
opinion) should not provide a basis for a monetary judgment. As stated by the Court in 
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Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d 125 (Ala. 1983) in discussing the effect of an advisory 
opinion, "Such an opinion has the effect of protecting such person to whom it is directed 
from liability . . . because of any official action or actions performed as directed or 
advised in such opinion." Id. at 128. In the instant circumstance, Brighton Title was 
prudent and followed the admonition of the agency charged with providing 
interpretations of the law to members of the industry. By so doing, it should be protected 
from liability for that compliance. The trial court erred by finding otherwise. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING IN iTHE CONTEXT OF A 
SPLIT CLOSING A TITLE COMPANY OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO BOTH 
PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION ESPECIALLY WHEN THE 
TRANSACTION IS ILLEGAL 
In rendering its summary judgment ruling, the trial court concluded that Brighton 
Title breached its fiduciary duty owed to Cooper. While generally, a title company acting 
as escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction, in the case of a 
split closing involving a separately retained title agent, the general rule should not apply. 
In the instant action, Cooper elected the transaction clqse as a "split closing" 
which means that the buyer engages its own title company anji the seller engages a 
different title company. The trial court held in this context, e^ch title company owes a 
fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction. This issue presents a question of law 
which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004;UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 
1242. Brighton title believes the Court erred as a matter of la|w because it owed no 
contractually based fiduciary duty to Cooper. 
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Generally, the rule is an escrow agent owes a duty to both parties to the 
transaction. Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Hertz v. 
Nordic Ltd, Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988). The obvious underlying 
assumption of the concept of fiduciary duties to all parties to the transaction involves a 
foundation that the parties include a Seller in title and a Buyer hoping to take title. It 
should not necessarily include a rogue who is not in title and structures a transaction to 
turn a quick profit in a prohibited transaction, using separate title agents to manipulate its 
shell game. 
However, the rule may well not apply in the circumstances of a split closing. In 
such cases, the seller retains the services of one title/escrow agency and the buyer 
employs another. Again, the Department of Insurance has provided a Bulletin which 
details the nature of such transactions. In Bulletin 2007-5, the Department of Insurance 
interpreted the provision of Section 31 A-23a-406(l), Utah Code Annotated, stating, 
In order to conduct an escrow, a title producer must be properly licensed, be 
appointed by an authorized title insurer, and issue one or more title insurance 
policies. 
A split escrow occurs when two of the parties to a real property transaction 
conduct their own portion of the escrow using two separate title producers. The 
use of two separate title producers creates two separate transactions and each 
separate transaction must comply with all of the requirements of an escrow. 
(R. 683-684). If the split escrow constitutes two separate transactions, then it is 
reasonable to interpret the duties of each title producer to extend only to the one party for 
whom they are employed or the one transaction in which it is involved. See e.g. Corridor 
v. Mahony, 986 So.2d 821 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08). Because Brighton Title was not a title 
producer to the transaction involving Cooper and its title producer, Metro National Title, 
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Brighton Title did not owe any fiduciary duties to Cooper. 
Cooper sued Brighton Title for breach of an alleged fiduciary duty. Had 
Brighton Title complied with Cooper's required performance, Brighton Title would have 
violated Utah law. There is no dispute a fiduciary must conduct itself with "scrupulous 
honesty, skill and diligence." See e.g. Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230, 
234, 383 P.2d 119, 121 (1963). If such is the general standard of conduct, pregnant in 
said standard is the obligation to not engage in conduct which violates the law. Cooper's 
entire case is premised on the fact that regardless of the law, or its violation, Brighton 
Title had the obligation to comply with the contract, even if that meant violating the law. 
In Utah, illegality is a defense to contract claims. See e.g. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256. Thus, if the transaction which Cooper relies upon 
as the basis of its claim is a prohibited transaction which has been declared illegal based 
on the statutes and the Department of Insurance' interpretation thereof, Brighton Title 
had no duty to complete the requirements of the otherwise illegal contract. 
The statutes at issue, as well as their interpretative bulletins are prophylactic. 
They are designed to prevent illegal conduct, as well as provide a sanction for engaging 
in such conduct. The bulletins interpreting the statutes make clear title companies are to 
be aware of and look for transactions which violate the law and to not participate therein. 
Cooper continually argued Brighton Title had no legal obligation to follow the 
interpretations set forth in the bulletins, implying Brighton Title could simply ignore 
them because they did not have the force of law. By analogy, Cooper's argument equates 
to arguing that attorneys should disregard Bar Ethics Opinions because they do not have 
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the force of law. While such ethics opinions may not have the force of law, no one 
within the Bar would pretend that attorneys are not expected to conform their conduct to 
the interpretations of these opinions. To the contrary, everyone knows that conduct in 
contravention of such opinions can lead to censure and sanctions. In the instant case, the 
bulletins are no different other than their application to a different industry. Within the 
industry, it is undisputed all title/escrow agents are fully expected to comply with the 
interpretations of statute which are embodied in the bulletins. To do otherwise is to 
invent censure and sanctions. 
By implication, Cooper argued and the trial court accepted the argument that 
because the parties agreed to contractual terms which violate the law, the law applicable 
is unenforceable. This is clearly not the case. Utah law on this point is crystal clear. 
"[C]ontracts and corporate acts and transactions which are malum in se or malum 
prohibitum, which contravene some rule of public policy, [or] violate some public duty . . 
. are illegal and void." Hatch v. Lucky Bill Mining Co., 25 Utah 405, 71 P. 865, 866 
(1903); See also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). The clear 
general rule is "every contract in violation of law is void." Castleglen, Inc., v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 984 F.2d 1571, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 
141, 206 P. 553, 555 (1922)). The trial court ignored the clear law of the state of Utah. 
If the contract is illegal, it is void. Thus, because the contract violated Utah law, 
Brighton owed no duty to Cooper on the void contract. 
In the instant case, the contract proposed an illegal transaction. As structured, 
the transaction violated the good funds statute. Further, because Brighton Title could not 
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insure the transaction, it was precluded from acting as the escrow agent on the 
transaction. Regardless of generic "black letter law", the mor^ specific requirements of 
the Utah Code, coupled with the Insurance Departments interpretation of those statutes 
and what constituted a violation thereof, dictated the very course of conduct undertaken 
by Brighton Title. The contract was illegal and Brighton Title|recognized that, thereby 
refusing to further participate in the transaction. The trial couijt erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that Brighton Title (a) owed a fiduciary duty to Cooper and (b) in the face 
of the illegality of the proposed transaction, Brighton Title was nonetheless obligated to 
release the escrowed earnest money deposit to Metro National Title, Cooper's separate 
escrow agent. Thus, this Court must reverse the trial court's gjrant of summary judgment. 
IV 
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BOUND BY A CONTRACT 
TO WHICH IT WAS NOT A PARTY 
The trial court found Brighton Title liable based on its breach of contract to 
Cooper. Brighton Title was not a party to the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky. 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de 
Vill, 2004 UT 102, \ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. The trial court erre4 
holding Brighton Title liable. 
novo. Savage v. Utah Youth 
as a matter of law in 
Cooper and Deseret Sky entered into a Real Estate Purbhase Agreement. (R. 532-
541). In Addendum No. 1 to Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Cooper and Deseret Sky 
agreed the earnest money would be deposited with Brighton Title. (R. 536). In 
Addendum No. 2, the same parties agreed the earnest money would be deposited with 
Metro National Title. (R. 538). Finally, in Addendum No. 3^  the parties finally agreed 
33 
"All earnest money shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and shall be released 
to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MST." (R. 540). At no time did 
Brighton Title sign the Real Estate Purchase Agreement nor any of the Addendums 
thereto. 
Brighton Title was not a party to the contract. It is only by the terms of the 
contract Cooper could elect liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money. 
Because Cooper made that election under the terms of the contract, its relief pursuant to 
that contract was limited to a judgment against the Deseret Sky as the only other party to 
that contract. Because Brighton Title was not a party to the contract, Cooper could not 
elect liquidated damages against Brighton Title. 
To the contrary, in order to recover anything against Brighton Title, Cooper had to 
prove actual damages. In the instant case, Cooper failed to provide any evidence to the 
trial court regarding its actual damages. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
in granting summary judgment to Cooper. 
Before Cooper is entitled to damages, whether liquidated or actual, it had the duty 
to establish the existence of a duty, its breach, and that the breach proximately caused it 
damages. In the instant case, as it relates to Brighton, Cooper has failed to prove any of 
those elements. But most significantly, it failed to prove proximate cause. The 
proximate cause of Cooper's damages, if any, was its own failure to purchase the 
Property from Hansen. Absent any title ownership, it could not be damaged by the 
failure of a subsequent sale [of something it did not own]. 
Second, the law on liquidated damages is clear. Not only must the Plaintiff 
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establish that the liquidated damages provision is reasonable, it must also establish that 
damages are otherwise difficult to calculate. See e.g. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 
292 P. 206,211 and Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P l d 446 (1952). In the 
instant case, the damages were not difficult to a calculate, as evidenced by the Cooper's 
calculation of the damages to the very last dollar. (R. 201). 
The Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages. It did not it the time and has never 
owned the property. The only actual damages which the Plaintiff suffered was its alleged 
loss of its earnest money paid to Hansen. However, the proximate cause of those damage 
was Cooper's inability to independently procure the property hrough the use of its own 
funds, as required by Utah law. Had Cooper so been able, this case would never have 
been brought before this Court. Rather, Cooper would have tjeen on title and the 
transaction would not have been an illegal flip. 
The shameful reality of this case is that Cooper, with1 mud caked hands, believes 
it is entitled to liquidated damages under its illegal contract, because somehow they were 
sufficiently shifty to effectively tie up a parcel of real property until it had a buyer who 
could fund the transaction. Cooper requested the trial court ignore the law and it did so. 
But as importantly, Cooper asked the trial court to ignore the ireality—at no time, even up 
through the date of this brief, has Cooper ever owned the subject property. Despite its 
misrepresentation in the REPC it held fee title, Cooper argues it has been damaged. This 
argument could hold water if, and only if, Cooper had acquired title to the property. 
Cooper never did. So the question became, should the trial court grant a six figure 
judgment for breach of contract for the sale of real property which the seller never owned 
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where the transaction was illegal under Utah law? The answer should have been clear. It 
should not. Despite this clarity, the trial court ignored the facts, ignored the law, and 
granted summary judgment to Cooper. It should be reversed. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO COOPER WHEN 
IT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ITS AFFIRMATIVE 
MISREPRESENTATION THAT IT HELD FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
Cooper breached the REPC at the point of its execution and was the party first in 
breach. The trial court erred in granting judgment to Cooper when it did not and never 
has held fee title to the property, but nonetheless affirmatively represented it held fee 
title. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah 
Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Cooper never held title to the 
property and was the party first in breach, the Court erred in granting Cooper judgment as 
a matter of law. 
Utah law is clear. "The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to 
a contract excuses farther performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master 
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). What constitutes a material 
breach is a question of fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
added clarity in defining a material breach, stating, ua failure of performance which 
defeats the very object of the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract 
would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated is a 
material failure." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). In the 
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instant case, the very object of the contract was the sale of real property. At no time did 
Cooper own the real property. This lack of ownership was a material breach because 
Deseret Sky most certainly would not have agreed to purchase the property from Cooper 
had it known at the time of the execution of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement Cooper 
did not own the property. As such, Cooper's material breach excused all performance 
under the terms of the contract, including any obligations which may have been owed by 
Brighton Title. In the context of the sale of real property, the lack of ownership of the 
property by the seller as a matter of law should be declared a material prior breach. 
Moreover, the ownership of the property by the seller should be a condition 
precedent to any performance obligations on the part of the purchaser. The ownership is 
a condition precedent to any requirement from the buyer to purchase the property. MA 
condition precedent may qualify the existence of an entire contract or only the 
performance of a contractual duty. Where only the performance of a duty is qualified by 
the condition, failure of the condition excuses that performance only and the remaining 
provisions of the contract remain in effect." Quealy v. Anderson, 114 P.2d 667, 673 
(Utah 1986). In the instant action, the condition precedent failed. Cooper was not the 
owner of the property at the time it represented it owned fee title to the property. (R. 
641). The condition precedent to Deseret Sky's obligation to burchase failed. As such, 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Cooper summary judgment. Because 
Deseret Sky's obligation to perform was excused by Cooper's lack of fee title to the 
property, Brighton Title was similarly excused. Summary judgment should be reversed. 
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VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
THAT COOPER DID NOT HAVE TO BE IN TITLE DURING THE 
EXECUTORY PERIOD WHEN COOPER HAD NO ABILITY TO GET IN TITLE 
ABSENT THE FUNDS FROM THE DESERET SKY CLOSING. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Cooper did not have to be in 
title during the executory period, when Cooper had no independent ability to get in title 
absent the funds from the Deseret Sky closing. This issue presents a question of law 
which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d 
1242. Because Cooper could not use Deseret Sky's funds to close its transaction with 
Hansen without violating Utah law, there was no evidence before the Court that Cooper 
could have gotten title at during the executory period. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Cooper argued it was not required under 
Utah law to be in title during the entire executory period, based on the law as set forth in 
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981). While this is a correct statement, it 
nonetheless fails to fully explain Neves and also misapplies the requirements of the Court 
in Neves. Simply put, Neves stands for the proposition that while Cooper did not have to 
be in title during the entire executory period, in a fact specific, case by case inquiry, the 
Seller was required to be able to convey clear title when the final payment was due. 
Because of the structure of the instant transaction, Cooper was not in the position to do 
so. 
The rule in Neves was premised on early Utah cases which define the contours of 
the holding in Neves. For instance, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909), the 
Court ruled the governing principle was "whether the title was beyond the control of the 
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vendor so that his acts amounted to a repudiation of his contract." Id. at 669-70. The 
Neves Court stated 
A defect which, by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter 
is one "of such a nature that the vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense 
any prospect of acquiring i t ' 
Neves at 1200 citing to Davis v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 2$3, 465 P.2d 702 (1970) 
and Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951). the Neves Court further 
stated, "it is essential that in t u i \ case tlu u l>\ a i lose s< iu1in\ il Ihe facts, and llie rale 
must be carefully applied to avoid unfairness, sharp practice, ^nd outright dishonesty." 
Id. at 1199. 
Cooper suggested to the trial court that it should apply the geneial mle, in a 
mannc i w hit li pi < >i n< >tes unfairness, shaip practice and outright dishonesty. It is 
undisputed on the date the parties entered into the REPC, Coqper did not have fee title. 
(R.199-200; Ml; 532-541). It is further undisputed Cooper's .purchase of the property 
from Hansen required Coopei use pail ol the mone\ paid by Deseret Sk\ 1o • ompiete its 
acquisition of title. (R. 551-552). 
A close scrutiny of the undisputed facts, leads to a single conclusion. Specifically, 
Cooper could not as a practical inaltci remove the defect, i.e. its la* k of let title, before 
Deseret Sky performed by paying the money. As such, its inability to convey title 
justified Deseret Sky's lack of performance. Further, these s$me defects left Brighton no 
choice but to withdraw lioin the transaction md leiuucl tlu money on dqxMt to its 
tlepositot Deseiet Sk1 IV\e1opnn nl 
Cooper requested the Trial Court grant it relief based 0n the terms of the contract, 
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asking the Courl to ignore Cooper's own material breach of the contract at the time of its 
making. Specifically, in the REPC, Cooper represented it had fee title to the property. 
There were no qualifiers or conditions on that representation. This representation was at 
the time of its making false. Further, it has remained false from that day through today. 
At no time has Cooper had fee title to the subject property. 
If Cooper did not have fee title, Brighton Title, who was responsible in part for 
insuring the transaction and the title, could not insure the property. Because Brighton 
could not insure the property, it could not act as escrow agent. Regardless of what the 
contract may have stated, the law states otherwise. The trial court erred as a matter of 
law in granting summary judgment to Cooper who materially breached the contract 
excusing all performance by both Brighton Title and Deseret Sky. 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING BRIGHTON TITLE 
BREACHED ITS DUTY TO COOPER WHERE THE TRANSACTION WAS AN 
ILLEGAL FLIP 
The instant transaction was an illegal flip. Because the transaction was illegal, the 
trial court erred in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper. This issue 
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 
UT 102, f^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because the transaction was precluded as a matter of law, 
Brighton Title did not breach its duty to Cooper by refusing to participate in the 
transaction. 
The instant transaction amounted to an illegal flip in which Brighton Title could 
not participate. As such, Brighton Title had no choice but to withdraw from the 
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transaction and refund the money on deposit to its depositor, Deseret Sky. 
A flip transaction is one in which the owner of a parcel )f real property ("Seller 
A") intends to sell it to a buyer ("Buyer A") who intends to imlmediately resell the 
property to a subsequent buver ("Buyer B") \ Ihp It tn > i tionnm eiflu i In I c i l u r 
illegal. A legal flip transaction occurs where Buyer A brings tb the table its own 
independent funds and completes the purchase from Seller A i|n its entirety separately 
from the subsequent sale to Buyer H
 NM I A-23a-4Un Utah t ode Annotated K ^ u 153-
i>, and Bulletin 200/-I. A ilip tiansaction stiuctuied in this fashion is entirely legal. 
An illegal flip transaction arises when Buyer A relies on the funds from Buyer B 
to purchase the property from Sella A §31 A-23a-4()f>, Utah Pode Annotated; IJ ^90-
li>3-i>; and Bulletin 200/-I. 1 he instant ti insaction n a •> an illegal I lip Ivtausel oopci 
was relying on the funds provided from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the 
property from Hansen. (R. 551-552). 
Because tin tiansaction was an illegal Hip BiHilon lith A a^  specifically 
precluded from participating by both the statutes of the State (if Utah as well as the 
Department of Insurance interpretations of those statutes as sdt forth in its bulletin. The 
mal i unit ened as a nutttei ol law in granting sumniai s judgment 
VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
THAT A TITLE COMPANY MAY ACT AS AN ESCROW AGENT IN A 
TRANSACTION IT C 4NNOT INSURE 
Brighton I ill* a< Inl is liolli an in.nn i HHICSUIW igenl HI ihh dansai linn I In 
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that in such circumstances. Brighton 
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Title could act as the escrow agent in a transaction it could not insure. This issue presents 
a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^  
17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, it could not 
participate in that transaction in any way. 
It is undisputed that Brighton could not insure the transaction, because it was a 
prohibited flip transaction as set forth in Bulletin 2007-1. Because it could not provide 
insurance on the transaction, it was prohibited by the terms of Bulletin 2007-5 from 
conducting any part of the split closing without violating the Departments interpretation 
of the relevant provision of the Utah Code. As such, Brighton Title had no choice but to 
return the funds on deposit to their depositor, because to do otherwise would have 
violated the law. 
Further, pursuant to Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), if a title agent cannot issue a title insurance policy, they are prohibited by law 
from conducting the escrow. As soon as the underwriter refused to insure the transaction, 
Brighton Title was prohibited by law from conducting escrow services on the transaction. 
The facts were not in dispute before the trial court. Brighton Title's underwriter 
refused to insure the transaction because it was an illegal flip which violated Utah law. 
(R. 571-573). Because Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, it was not able to 
act as escrow agent on the transaction. Moreover, as previously stated, the transaction in 
its entirety was illegal. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Cooper 
summary judgment. 
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IX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING BRIGHTON TITLE VIOLATED 
RULE 7(C)(3)(B), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling Brighton Title violated Rule 
7(c)(3)(B) oit he I it ill Rules of Civil Procedure. A tnal court'ls interpretation of the rales 
of civil procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah 
Youth VilL, 2004 111 1 f U. 1| I I 0 J I1 ul I ' I Brighton Title did not seek to controvert 
the facts set forth h ( oupei rather it created a genuine issue Of material hk I Ihmugh the 
addition of facts not presented by Cooper. 
In its Minute Entry, the Court stated that "Defendant Brighton Title Company's 
responsive memoiauduni iaik d 1m uinph ^ iih llu u i|inrements of Rule ^(i )(3)( B) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs 
statement of undisputed facts is uncontroverted, and that there1 is no genuinue issue of 
material fact in dispute " (R 707-709). After Brighton Title objected, I he < oui I enteied 
a clarifying order stating it noted the violation but did not use the violation as a basis for 
granting summary judgment. (R. 783). 
Brighton Title did not violate Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules o! i i\ il Procedure. 
Specifically, tin*, mile slates 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall a verbatim 
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and ma) 
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving 
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation 
of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
affidavit or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing 
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and Numbered and supported by 
citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
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Id. In the instant case, Brighton Title did not violate the rule because it did not controvert 
the facts contained in the moving party's memorandum. Rule 7(c)(3)(b)?s verbatim 
requirement is only applicable if the facts are controverted. Where they are not, the 
verbatim requirement does not apply based on the plain reading of the rule. 
In the instant case, as clearly shown above, the facts Cooper presented were not in 
dispute. While Brighton Title submitted additional facts which created a genuine issue of 
material fact, it nonetheless did not have the obligation to comply with the verbatim 
statement requirements of Rule Rule 7(c)(3)(b). 
Brighton understands that if Rule 7(c)(3)(b) is violated, a Court has discretion 
based on that violation, to deem all facts admitted. See e.g. Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT 
App 291, 77 P.3d 339 (interpreting Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration the 
predecessor provision to Rule 7(c)(3)(b)). However, the strict formatting requirements 
have been referred to as technical requirements which may be dispensed of when there 
has been substantial compliance with the intent of the rule. See e.g. Salt Lake County v. 
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 89 P.2d 155 fn. 4 and Gary Porter Const, v. 
Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371. As noted by the Court in the Fox 
Construction case quoting from Metro Ready Mix case, 
Opposing memorandum [does] not set forth disputed facts listed in numbered 
sentences in a separate section as required [by the rule, as long as] the disputed 
facts [are] clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable record 
references,... failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 4-
501(2)(B) [is] harmless. 
Fox Constr. at 376 quoting Metro Ready Mix at fn. 4. Were the foregoing not sufficient, 
in Govrnt Trust v. Machinery, 2006 UT App 513, 154 P.3d 175, fn 5, the Court 
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recognized the uncertainty of the state of the law regarding noncompliance1 w itli f' tile 7's 
technical requirements. 
Regardless of that state of uncertainty, Rule 7 simply has no application where the 
nnnmowng party u iml innlion itin^ tlie facts asserted in the memorandum m support of 
summary judgment. Unless facts are being controverted, there is no verbatim 
requirement. The trial court erred as a matter of law in even suggesting that Brighton 
Title did not comply with the Requirements of Rule 7(C)O)0VL 1 Ttali Rules ol ( M it 
Proceduie 
Even assuming that Rule 7(c)(3)(b) had been violated, the consequences of any 
such violation are set forth in Rule 7(c)(3)(a). Under this provision, "Each fact set lorlh 
n I In in n i niz pai 1 \ "s memotandmn e doomed admit ti d I* i pui poses ot -uinniai u 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party." As such, because a failure to 
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(b) results in facts being deemed admitted, any such violation 
resolves only the question of whelhet then1 are facts in di putewhi li \M mid utlierw ise 
preclude the grant of summary judgment. It does not in anywav address the application 
of those facts to the applicable law. No court is justified in granting summary judgment 
as a in ittei ot law ha ad on in allu ul mlation of Rule 7(c)(3)(b) * iilmnl pun uling the 
legal analysis to support its decision. The trial court erred as a matter of law with respect 
to its application of Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to Brighton Title's 
memorandum A\ I tie it thereafter attempted to "correct" that misapplication, it did so in 
a vacuum oflegal leasomn^. 
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X 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO 
PROVIDE ANY ANALYSIS OR REASONING IN GRANTING COOPER 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SIGNING THE RULING 
PREPARED BY COOPER 
The trial court err as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to provide 
any analysis or reasoning in granting Cooper summary judgment. This issue presents a 
question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, j^ 
17, 104 P.3d 1242. Absent some analysis and reasoning by the Court, the parties are left 
in an absolute vacuum. This vacuum precludes any meaningful appellate review, leaving 
this Court with no choice but to remand to a trial court. Further, after failing to provide 
the parties with any insight into the basis of its decision, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in signing the ruling prepared by Cooper. 
Following briefing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Cooper. The 
minute entry cited the alleged violation of Rule 7(c)(3)(b) and stated based on that 
violation, there were no genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. (R. 707-08). It entered judgment against Brighton Title 
and Deseret Sky and ordered Cooper's counsel to prepare an "order consistent with this 
ruling." (R. 707-08). Brighton Title immediately file a motion for clarification. (R. 710-
729). During the briefing, Brighton Title's counsel received a proposed judgment and 
ruling. Brighton Title immediately file an objection to both. (R. 739-741 and 742-745). 
After briefing, the Court entered another minute entry. (R. 783-788). In this 
minute entry, the Court clarified its prior minute entry. The clarification reads: 
I have received and reviewed the briefing on Defendant, Brighton Title Company, 
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LLC's motion for clarification and reconsideration of the prior ruling on summary 
judgment. While I decline to reconsider arguments I fully considered previously, I 
will clarify my prior ruling as follows: 
1. Brighton Title's failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 7 was 
noted, but that was not the basis for the ruling. 
2. Since there was no material issues of fact, the matter was decided on the 
law. Brighton Title accepted earnest money in its capacity as the escrow agent for 
the real estate transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Deseret Sky. Pursuant 
to the terms of the contract, and the undisputed facts, the money became non-
refundable when it was not timely cancelled or objection made by Deseret Sky. 
Again, pursuant to the terms of the contract and undisputed fact, Brighton Title 
became obligation to forward the funds to Metro National Title. Instead, it 
refunded the money to Deseret Sky, in violation of its obligation to Plaintiff. 
While Brighton Title may have been concerned about Plaintiffs ability to 
obtain title to the subject property, it was not entitled to make its own 
determination about the rights or claims of the respective parties; it was obligated 
to fulfill its contractual and fiduciary duties as the escrow agent. (The Court notes 
that Brighton Title had an option of paying the funds into the Court, and allowing 
the other parties to litigate the issues, but chose not to do so.) 
The Bulletin referenced by Brighton Title does not have the force of law, 
and cannot be used to excuse Brighton Title's failure to perform. Pursuant to the 
undisputed facts, the real estate purchase contract did not violate any provision of 
Utah law. 
Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties, when it 
agreed to hold the funds as escrow agent. Refunding the money to Deseret Sky 
violated its duties, causing damage to Plaintiff in the amount of the escrowed 
funds 
I have received an Amended Notice to Submit, tiled by Plamtitt, relative to 
the form of the Judgment, as well as to the issue of attorney fees. Since I have 
issued this clarification to the earlier minute entry, I ask both counsel to review the 
proposed Judgment and determine if there may be an agreement as to the form. If 
not, Plaintiff is requested to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of the 
Judgment, so that the pleadings filed in connection with the objection may be 
reviewed in substance. 
The Minute Entry is the Ordei of the Court, and no additional Uidei is 
required to be prepared on this clarification. 
(R 783-84). Despite the clear instruction of the Court, Cooper submitted a detailed 
ruling which the Court ultimately stated was consistent with its decision and decided to 
sign. (R X()?-8(n and 804-828). 
First, the trial court absolutely erred as a matter of law in granting summarv 
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judgment without so much as a single stitch of legal reasoning or analysis to support its 
decision. But for the motion for clarification, neither this Court nor Brighton Title would 
have had any idea the basis upon which the Court concluded judgment was appropriately 
granted to Cooper. This Court should specifically clarify the duty of a trial court judge 
when granting summary judgment concerning its legal reasoning and basis for such a 
grant. 
Second, despite the Court having entered minute entries amounting to nothing 
more than three or four pages which consisted of both its decision and subsequent 
explanation of that decision, Cooper submitted a twenty four (24) page ruling which 
amounted to a verbatim reiteration of its memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment. While the Court signed the same after yet another minute entry, its doing so 
was an abuse of discretion. First, the Court never requested a ruling be submitted. 
Second, when the proposed Ruling was submitted, objections were lodged. Third, after 
clarifying its decision in another brief minute entry, Cooper took it upon itself to 
extrapolate a decision for the Court, taking two pages of substantive explanation and 
churning them into a twenty four (24) page ruling for which the Court had provided 
absolutely no basis. Overruling the objection, the Court signed the unsolicitated Ruling. 
Brighton Title does not believe a Court's lack of legal reasoning, analysis or 
conclusions can be cured by a simple instruction to the prevailing party to prepare an 
order consistent with the Court's ruling. Any such order which does anything more than 
recite the Court's ruling is objectionable. 
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Obviously, the Court's responsibility with respect to making findings and 
conclusions when rendering a decision on summary judgment must be viewed in the 
context of a potential appeal. In that context, "An appellate court reviews a trial court's 
"legal OIK lusion ^ uul ultinuU „ unt ni dun il oi sunini u s judgment1 for correctness, 
and views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn thereftom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.1" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 U^ 2, ^  6, 177 P.3d 600 
(quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993)). Howe\u where 
the Couit hilt d to make any findings oi piovide its legal conclusions, but only ultimately 
granted summary judgment, there is no basis for an appellate court to make such a 
review. 
The trial mil does not ha\ i Itu dut lo nuil i i lmdin<> noi on lusion, on 
every issue presented. However, it must make sufficient findings and conclusions so the 
appellate Court can understand how it reached its ultimate conclusion. Consolidation 
Coal Co. v Utah Div of State Lands & Forestry, 8b(» P M ^  I I h I I ill I ' ^ I inal 
court's conclusions of law must be supported by its findings of fact. See Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co , 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); 9 Charles A.'Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2579 (1971). 
It is imperative the trial court make its conclusions oft law known, even in cases 
where there are no disputed facts. Foi instance, the Utah Supreme Court granted a 
petition for certioi i in / PochynokCo. v. Smedsrud, '(Xh 111 V) I Id p ul 553, and 
obsent d tin d ul u ml h id in ill in lindiny4 of lac 1 ot t * m lusion t 1 i \ to explain il 
attorney fees decision. See id at Tf 5. Consequently, the partiessand the court v\ ere left to 
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conjecture in determining the trial court's reasoning. The Utah Supreme Court stated "Our 
difficulty is with the trial court's process, not necessarily the outcome." Id. at J^ 13. 
The instant case is no different. Unlike the case where a Court holds a hearing 
and explains the basis of its decision from the bench, and thereafter orders counsel for the 
prevailing party to prepare an Order consistent with those findings and conclusion orally 
proclaimed, in the instant case there was no hearing. There was no oral proclamation. 
There were no written conclusions. As such, there was no meaningful basis for an 
appellate court to review the trial court's decision. Once the Court clarified its decision, 
it was no less of an abuse of discretion for the Court to permit Cooper to submit an order 
which reiterated his summary judgment motion but was not consistent with the Court's 
Minute Entry. 
The problem which is inherent with the failure of the court to specify its 
conclusions of law is made clear when considered in the context of Rule 7(f)(2), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule states: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the 
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon 
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. 
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The 
party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
Id, [emphasis supplied]. In the instant case, an order in conformity with the Court's 
decision is both short and to the point. It cannot be a twenty six (26) page wish list 
which assumes the Court adopted wholesale the memoranda filed by the moving party, 
which is what has now been submitted to the Court. The Court erred as matter of law in 
50 
both failing to provide sufficient legal analysis and reasoning to support its decision. It 
erred again in approving and executing a ruling which was submitted without leave of the 
Court and was not in conformity with the Court's express decision. 
XI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
BRIGHTON TITLE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD 
Brighton ' I itle, as a defendant in tl lis actioi i, had "standing" to pai ticipate in the 
action. This right to participate included the right to challenge the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees. The Court ruled Brighton Title did not have standing. This issue presents 
a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah You:* I •" . 'n-:M : )2,^ [ 
17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Brighton Title was a defendant in this action, standing is not 
strictly applicable and it could challenge all issues in the litigation. 
The standard for an award of attorney fees is clear. It is within this Court's 
discretion to determine what fees are reasonable. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 t.zd 
985, 988 (Utah 1988) However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by 
evidence in the record. Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 : .~d 4Mi. 4VN •; l. lai 
1984); Bangerterv / \ mhon, 663 P.2< i 100, 103 H * • • iyz±)\see Cabren i v. Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) ("award of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis 
of findings of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate Conclusions of law"); 
Jenkin s v. Bailey, 676 P 2d 391 393 (I Jtaii 1984) (abuse of disci etion foi trial coi n t to 
award three times more than the amount of fees supported by the evidence); Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750-51 (Utah 1982) (since party did not 
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present evidence on issue of attorney fees at trial, trial court did not commit error in 
declining to make an award). 
Part of the trial court's discretion involves evaluation of the evidence presented. 
In addition, the trial court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted by one party in 
determining a reasonable fee. See, e.g., Appliance & Heating Supply, Inc. v. Telaroli, 682 
P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1984); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982). 
In Trayner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), the Court enlarged the list of 
potential factors by including "the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the 
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity 
of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights under the contract." Id. at 858 (citing Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). 
Finally, in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 69A P.2d 622 (Utah 1983), which contains our 
most detailed analysis of attorney fees to date, the Court added 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in 
the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Id. at 625. 
In Dixie State, the Court set forth four questions which must be answered in 
addressing attorney fees. The Court's questions included: 
Although all of the above factors maybe explicitly considered in determining a 
reasonable fee, as a practical matter the trial court should find answers to four 
questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
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2. How much of the work performed was reasonably hecessar} ^ 'idequately 
prosecute the matter? \ 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideraticjn of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of Professional Resbonsibility? 
I i at 991. 
A review of the affidavit and supporting documentation reveals that Cooper's 
counsel for the Plaintiff failed to answer all of the questions. Specificall>, counsel 
failed to specifically itemize each service1 nr.-\ iJ^! kainei , he lumped matters together, 
thereby precluding any ability to differentiate the time allottee to each particular task 
performed. 
As such Miij/hloii \\\\^x ohftvfeci lu (hr awan) of .ittnrnry firs cvm though the 
judgment was not entered against Brighton Title. The Court ienied the objection ruling 
Brighton Title lacked standing to object. (R. 786-787). Thii» ruling was in error. Issues 
regarding standing pK->ent questions of law I hah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. I hah Air 
Quality Bd.9 2006 UT 74? fflf 13-15, 148 P.3d 960. 
Tn Utah, standing is generally conferred upon a party vfho has ,f>a personal stake in 
the outcome of the dispute."1" Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 
2003 UT 58, \ 20, 82 P.3d 1125 (quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board 
of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)). The vast maionty of Utah standing law 
has developed in the context of evaluating a plaintiffs <ii-ii'ty to prosecute a claim, not a 
defendants ability to defend against it Ii I fa :±, a re\ iev - ot the standing cases in I Jtah do 
not reveal any cases where a defendant was precluded from defending against anv part of 
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the case because they lacked standing. As noted by the Court in Knight v. Alabama, 14 
F.3d 1534, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994), l?[I]t is not generally required that a defendant have any 
particular 'standing5 in order to be sued in a trial court. . . . " As such, contrary to the 
unsupported assertion of Cooper, Brighton Title does not need to have standing. Once 
Cooper sued Brighton Title, Brighton Title had the right to folly defend every aspect of 
the case. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Brighton Title lacked 
standing to challenge the award of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court. The Court erred in granting summary 
judgment because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding Brighton Title was not bound to follow the Utah Insurance Department's 
bulletins. The trial court erred in concluding in the context of a split closing a title 
company owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction especially when the 
transaction especially when the transaction illegal. Brighton Title was not contractually 
bound by a conlract to which it was not a party. The trial court erred in granting 
judgment to Cooper when it breached the contract by its affirmative misrepresentations 
that it held fee title to the property. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding 
that Cooper did not have to be on title during the executor period when Cooper had no 
ability to be get on title absent fonds from the Deseret Sky closing. The trial court erred 
in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper where the transaction was an 
illegal flip. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that a title company 
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may act as an escrow agent in a transaction it cannot insure. The trial court erred in 
ruling Brighton Title violated Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial 
court erred as a matter of law by failing to provide any analysis or reasoning m granting 
Cooper summary judgment and in signing the i tiling prepaied by Coopei. finally, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law concluding Brighton Title did not have standing to 
challenge the attorney fee award. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court and 
rem.mil foi iuitht t pioi codings. 
STATEMENT OF ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto as an the addendum includes the following: 
1. §31A-23a 106 Utah ( otk \nnoiated; 
2. Bulletin 2007-1; 
3. Bulletin 2007-5; 
4. Minute Entry dated January 7, 2009; 
5. Minuk 1 nil \ (Uicd 1 rbiuaiy 19, 2009, 
6. Minute Entry dated February 20, 2009; 
7. Minute Entry dated March 1 (\ 2009; 
8. llulin j Dii Plaintiffs Motion l< i Suniniaix Judgment and Defendant 
term 
r 
Brighton Title Company's Count otion For Summary Judgment. 
I® 
Dated and^Jigned this \__ day of June, 2009. 
Adam I-
Stowelfow PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant, Brighton Title 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 944-3459 
Facsimile: (801) 483-0705 
57 
FETING—LICENSING PRODUCERS, ETC. § 31A-23a-406 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
nposite section by the Office of Legislative Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
rch and General Counsel of Laws 2005, c. Research and General Counsel of Laws 2007, c 
9 and Laws 2005, c 185, § 10. 307, § IS and Laws 2007. c. 325, § 9. 
Cross References 
'river licenses, access to records, use of per- Title and Escrow Commission, see § 31A-2-401 
identifying information, see § 53-3-109. et seq. 
4-23a-406. Title insurance producer's business 
A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of 
Mowing exist: 
a) the title insurance producer is licensed with: 
(i) the title line of authority; and 
(ii) the escrow subline of authority; 
b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer authorized to do business 
he state; 
:) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction: 
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or 
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance; 
1)(i) all funds deposited with the title insurance producer in connection with any escrow: 
(A) are deposited: 
(I) in a federally insured financial institution; and 
(II) in a trust account that is separate from all other trust account funds that are 
not related to real estate transactions; and 
(B) are the property of the persons entitled to them under the provisions of the 
escrow; and 
(ii) are segregated escrow by escrow in the records of the title insurance producer; 
i) earnings on funds held in escrow may be paid out of the escrow account to any 
son in accordance with the conditions of the escrow; and 
) the escrow does not require the title insurance producer to hold: 
(i) construction funds; or 
(ii) funds held for exchange under Section 1031, Internal Revenue Code.] 
Notwithstanding Subsection (li, a title insurance producer,may engage in the esci'ow 
;ss if: 
0 the escrow involves: 
(i) a mobile home; 
(ii) a grazing right; 
(iii) a water right; or 
(iv) other personal property authorized by the commissioner; and 
0 the title insurance producer complies with all the requirements of this section except 
,he requirement of Subsection (l)(c). 
Funds held in escrow: 
) are not subject to any debts of the title insurance producer; 
i) may only be used to fulfill the terms of the individual escrow under which the funds 
3 accepted; and 
) may not be used until all conditions of the escrow have been met. 
Assets or property other than escrow funds received by a title insurance producer in 
ance with an escrow shall be maintained in a manner that will: 
) reasonably preserve and protect the asset or property from loss, theft, or damages; 
) otherwise comply with all general duties and responsibilities of a fiduciary or bailee. 
235 
§ 31A-23a-406 INSURANCE CODE 
(5Ka) A check from the trust account described in Subsection-('Did) may not be drawn, 
executed, or dated, or funds otherwise disbursed unless the segregated escrow account from 
which funds are to be disbursed contains a sufficient, credit balance consisting of collected or 
cleared funds at the time the check is drawn, executed, or dated, or funds are othenvise 
disbursed. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (5), funds are considered to be "collected or cleared," and 
may be disbursed as follows: 
(i) cash ma\- be disbursed on the same day the cash is deposited; 
(ii) a wire transfer may be disbursed On the same day the wire transfer is deposited; 
(hi) the following may be disbursed on the dav following the date of deposit: 
(A) a cashiers check; 
(B) a certified check; 
(C) a teller's check; 
(D) a U.S. Postal Service money order; and 
(E) a check drawn on a Federal Reseiwe Bank or Federal Home Loan Bank: and 
(iv) any other check or deposit may be disbursed: 
(A) within the time limits provided under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 
U.vS.C. Section 4001 et seq., as amended, and related regulations of the Federal 
Reserve System; or 
(B) upon written notification from the financial institution to which the funds have 
been deposited, that final settlement has occurred on the deposited item. 
(c) Subject to Subsections (5)(.a) and (b), any material change to a settlement statement 
made after the final closing documents are 'executed must be authorized or acknowledged 
by date and signature on each page of the settlement statement by the one or more persons 
affected by the change before disbursement of funds. 
(6) The title insurance producer shall maintain records of all receipts and disbursements of 
escrow funds. 
(7) The title insurance produce}- shall comply with: 
(a) Section 31A-23a-409; 
(b.) Title 46, Chapter 1. Notaries Public Reform Act; and 
(c) any rules adopted by the Title and Escrow Commission , subject to Section 
31A-2-404, that govern escrows. 
Laws 1985. c. 242, § 28; Laws 1989, c. 94, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 164. § 1: Laws 1997, c. 185, § 11. etf. July 
1. 1997; Laws 2001, c. 116. S 148, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002. c. 308, § 56, eft May 6. 2002; Laws 
2003, c. 298. § 66, eff. May 5, 3003; Laws 2004, c. 117. § 5, eff. Mav 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 124, § 7, eff. 
May 2. 2005; Laws 2005. c. 185. § 11, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 325, § 10, eff. April 30, 2007.. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 31A-23-307. 
i 26 U.S.C.A. § 1031. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2005, c. 
124, § 7 and Laws 2005, c. 185. § 11. 
Cross References 
Title and escrow commission, see § 31A-2-401 
et seq. 
§ 31A-23a-415. Assessment on title insurance agencies or title insurers 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Premium" is as defined in Subsection 59-9-101(3). 
(b) "Title insurer'1 means a person: 
(i) making any contract or policy of title insurance as: 
(A) insurer; 
D KENT MICHIE JON M HUNTSMAN, JR 
Insurance Commissioner Governor 
Utah Insuiuice Department 
BULLETIN 2007-1 
To: All Title Insurance Insurers, Agencies and Producers 
From: D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner, 
and the Title and Escrow Commission 
Subject: Prohibited Escrow Settlement Closing Transactions 
Due to the large number of "land flip" transactions and the use by real estate agents of the 
Simultaneous Closing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract (a copy of which is attached), 
and due to the fact that "flipping" real estate often involves fraud, the Utah Insurance 
Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission have determined the following structure to 
be the only permitted method of acting as escrow wherein the same parcel of property is 
purchased and then immediately sold. 
The transactions effected by this bulletin are those transactions in which Seller "A" contracts 
with Buyer "Bl" to sell a parcel of property. Buyer "B" then contracts with Buyer "Cv to sell the 
same parcel of property. Buyer "B" anticipates acquiring the parcel and selling the parcel at or 
near the same time. 
The transaction between Seller "A" and Buyer "B" must close independently from the 
transaction between Buyer 'TT and Buyer CkC." The funds deposited by Buyer "C" may not be 
used to fund the closing between Seller "A" and Buyer "B." Buyer '*B" must provide funds 
independent of the funds generated by Buyer "C." 
A policy of title insurance must be issued in the Seller "A" to Buyer "B" transaction and in the 
Buyer "B" to Buyer "C" transaction. Each real estate transaction must stand on its own. Buyer 
UB" must close with Buyer "B's" own good funds and record so that Buyer "B" is in title prior to 
the second transaction closing and recording. 
The above structure insures compliance with 31A-23a-406 and R590-153-5. 
31A-23a-406. Title insurance producer's business. 
(1) A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of the 
following exist: 
(a) the title insurance producer is licensed with: 
(i) the title line of authority; and 
(ii) the escrow subline of authority; 
(b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer authorized to do business in the 
state; 
(c) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction: 
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or 
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance; 
(5) (a) A check from the trust account described in Subsection (l)(d) may not be drawn, 
executed, or dated, or funds otherwise disbursed unless the segregated escrow account from 
which funds are to be disbursed contains a sufficient credit balance consisting of collected or 
cleared funds at the time the check is drawn, executed, or dated, or fbnds are otherwise 
disbursed. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (5), funds are considered to be ''collected or cleared," and may 
be disbursed as follows: 
(i) cash may be disbursed on the same day the cash is deposited; 
(ii) a wire transfer may be disbursed on the same day the wire transfer is deposited; 
(iii) the following may be disbursed on the day following the datfe of deposit: 
(A) a cashier's check; 
(B) a certified check; 
(C) a teller's check; 
(D) a U.S. Postal Service money order; and 
(E) a check drawn on a Federal Reserve Bank or Federal Home Loan Bank; and 
(iv) any other check or deposit may be disbursed: 
(A) within the time limits provided under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. 
Section 4001 et seq., as amended, and related regulations of the Federal Reserve System; or 
(B) upon written notification from the financial institution to which the funds have been 
deposited, that final settlement has occurred on the deposited item. 
(c) Subject to Subsections (5)(a) and (b), any material change to a settlement statement made 
after the final closing documents are executed must be authorized or acknowledged by date and 
signature on each page of the settlement statement by the one or mpre persons affected by the 
change before disbursement of funds." 
R590-153-5. Unfair Methods of Competition, Acts and Practices. 
The commissioner finds that providing or offering to provide any of the following benefits by 
parties identified in Section R590-153-3 to any client, either directly or indirectly, except as 
specifically allowed in Section R5 90-153-6 below, is a material and unfair inducement to obtaining 
title insurance business and constitutes an unfair method of competition in the business of title 
insurance prohibited under Section 31 A-23a-402: 
E. Deferring or waiving any payment for insurance or services otherwise due and payable, 
including "holding for resale." 
LEGAL FLIPS 
Part 1 Part 2 
There is nothing wrong with buying 
property to sell for a profit... 
even in the short term. 
ILLEGAL FLIPS / EQUITY SKIMMING 
Part 1 Part 2 •^mm^ 
> There is a violation of the "good funds" (collected & 
cleared by bank) statute if you use proceeds from Buyer "C" 
to fund Seller "A". 
> Buyer "B" is selling property to "C," which buyer UB" does 
not yet hold title to. 
Dated this 30th day of January 2007. 
D. KENT MICHEE 
Utah Insurance Commissioner 
Bulletin 2007 - 5 
To: All Title Insurers, Title Agencies, and Title Producers 
From: D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner 
Date: June 14,2007 
Subject: Prohibited Split Escrows 
The purpose of this bulletin is to clarify for all persons conducting a split escrow those 
split escrows that are prohibited. This bulletin supersedes all prior communications to the 
title industry reference a split escrow. 
Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) Subsection 31 A-23a-406 (1) states as follows: 
(1) A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of 
the following exist: 
(a) the title insurance producer is licensed with: 
(i) the title line of authority; and 
(ii) the escrow subline of authority; 
(b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer autiiuuzcu iu do business 
in the state; 
(c) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction: 
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or 
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance; 
(d) (i) all funds deposited with the title insurance producer in connection with any 
escrow: 
(A) are deposited: 
(I) in a federally insured financial institution; and 
(II) in a trust account that is separate from all other trust account rlinds that are not 
related to real estate transactions; and 
(B) are the property of the persons entitled to them under the provisions of the escrow; 
and 
(ii) are segregated escrow by escrow in the records of the title insurance producer; 
(e) earnings on funds held in escrow may be paid out of the escrow account to any 
person in accordance with the conditions of the escrow; and 
(f) the escrow does not require the title insurance producer to hol^ J: 
(i) construction funds; or 
(ii) funds held for exchange under Section 1031, Internal Revenue Code. 
In order to conduct an escrow, a title producer must be properly licensed, be appointed by 
an authorized title insurer, and issue one or more title insurance policies. 
A split escrow occurs when two of the parties to a real property transaction conduct their 
portion of the escrow using two separate title producers. The use of two separate title 
producers creates two separate transactions and each separate transaction must comply 
with all of the requirements to conduct an escrow. 
A split escrow consists of two separate transactions with each transaction 
being done by a properly licensed title producer appointed by an 
authorized title insurer that issues either an owner's or a lender's title 
insurance policy. 
A prohibited split escrow occurs if either of the two separate transactions 
does not comply with all three of the requirements to conduct an escrow. 
A cash only split escrow is prohibited because one of the separate transactions does not 
include the issuance of a title policy. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 2007 
D. Kent Michie 
Commissioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
etal, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 070913234 
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Company's counter-motion for summary judgment. 
Based upon a review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the oourt rules as follows. 
1. The request for hearing is denied. The Court has reviewed the pleadings filed 
in this matter, and oral argument would not be of assistance in ruling. 
2. The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant Deseret Sky 
has not responded to Plaintiff's motion. Defendant Brighton Title Company's responsive 
memorandum failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff's statement of 
undisputed facts is uncontroverted, and that there is no genuine issue of material fact in 
dispute. Additionally, based upon the memoranda filed, the Court concludes that Plaintiff 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment against both defendants, jointly and 
severally; as to Deseret Sky Development, for the entire amount of liquidated damages and 
o 
as to Brighton Title Company, for the $100,000 returned to Deseret Sky. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is requested to prepare an order consistent with this rul 
Dated this 7 daY o f January, 2009 
BY THE COURT: 
?ANDRA PEULER ft <\ -
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE";; 
/
 } - y^ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ADAM L CRAYK 
Attorney DEF 
525 S 300 EAST STE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail SAMANTHA J SLARK 
Attorney DEF 
50 W BROADWAY STE 700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail SCOTT R WANGSGARD 
Attorney PLA 
57 W 200 S STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this Z5 day of -=Q g_AK t 2 0 ^ ^ . 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE #070913234 
February 19,2009 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
I have received and reviewed the briefing on Defendant, Brighton Title Company, 
LLC's motion for clarification and reconsideration of the prior ruling on summary judgment. 
While I decline to reconsider arguments I fully considered previously, I will clarify my prior 
ruling, as follows. 
1. Brighton Title's failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 7 was noted, but 
that was not the basis for the ruling. 
2. Since there were no material issues of fact, the matter was decided on the law. 
Brighton Title accepted earnest money in its capacity as the escrow agent for the real 
estate transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Deseret Sky. Pursuant to the terms of 
the contract, and the undisputed facts, the money became non-refundable when it was not 
timely cancelled or objection made by Deseret Sky. Again, pursuant to the terms of the 
contract and the undisputed facts, Brighton Title became obligated to forward the funds to 
Metro National Title. Instead, it refunded the money to Deseret Sky, in violation of its 
obligation to Plaintiff 
While Brighton Title may have been concerned about Plaintiffs ability to obtain title 
to the subject property, it was not entitled to make its own determination about the rights 
or claims of the respective parties; it was obligated to fulfill its contractual and fiduciary 
duties as the escrow agent. (The Court notes that Brighton Title had an option of paying 
the funds into the Court, and allowing the other parties to litigate the issues, but chose not 
to do so.) 
The Bulletin referenced by Brighton Title does not have the force of law, and cannot 
be used to excuse Brighton Title's failure to perform. Pursuant to the undisputed facts, 
the real estate purchase contract did not violate any provision of Utah law. 
Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties, when it agreed 
to hold the funds as escrow agent. Refunding the money to Deseret Sky violated its 
duties, causing damage to Plaintiff in the amount of the escrowed funds. 
I have received an Amended Notice to Submit, filed by Plaintiff, relative to the form 
of the Judgment, as well as to the issue of attorneys fees. Since I have issued this 
clarification to the earlier minute entry, I ask both counsel to reyiew the proposed Judgment 
and determine if there may be an agreement as to the form. If not, Plaintiff is requested 
to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of the Judgment, so that the pleadings filed in 
connection with the objection may be reviewed in substance. 
This Minute Entry is the Order of the Court, and no additional Order is required to 
be prepared on this clarification. 
Dated this t ^ day of February, 2009 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail 
Mail 
Mail 
Dated t h i s ^>liS day of r& ll 
ADAM L CRAYK 
Attorney DEF 
525 S 300 EAST STE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
SAMANTHA J SLARK 
Attorney DEF 
5 0 W BROADWAY STE 70 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
SCOTT R WANGSGARD 
Attorney PLA 
57 W 200 S STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
2 0 Q °\ 
1 I I A f^P-fYiA 
Deputy Court (?l'erk \ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE #070913234 
February 20, 2009 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Before the Court is an Amended Notice to Submit'for Decision on Defendant 
Brighton Title Company, LLC's Objection to Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs. Based 
upon a review of the pleadings, the Court rules as stated herein. 
The Plaintiffs Complaint, on which summary judgment was granted, sought an 
award of attorneys fees, based upon the contract enterecji into between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLC. The only Defendant liable for fees is Deseret 
Sky, pursuant to the contract. Since that Defendant did not contest the summary judgment 
motion, no ruling was necessary on the issue of attorneys f^es. 
Defendant Brighton Title lacks standing to contest the attorneys fees awarded 
against Deseret Sky. Therefore, its objection is denied. Neither Defendant has objected 
to the requested costs. 
The Amended Notice to Submit also seeks a ruling oh Brighton Title's Objection to 
Plaintiffs draft of ruling. Since the Court clarified the bases for its ruling on summary 
judgment, and requested counsel to make a further determination as to whether they can 
-2-
agree on the form of the order, the Court will await that determination Upon 
notice by either counsel that they are not able to agree, the Court will address that issue 
The Court notes that the Plaintiffs previously-prepared proposed Ruling and Judgment 
have been received 
This Minute Entry will stand as the Order of the Court, and no additional order is 
required to be prepared on this issue. 
Dated this *ZO day of February, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ADAM L CRAYK 
Attorney DEF 
525 S 300 EAST STE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail SAMANTHA J SLARK 
Attorney DEF 
50 W BROADWAY STE 70 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail SCOTT R WANGSGARD 
Attorney PLA 
57 W 200 S STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this
 (y[f) day of \~(P.AK 20C 
K ML 
Deputy Court
 (6lerk 
xlOx/J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE #070913234 
March 16, 2009 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
I have received and reviewed the Plaintiff's proposed Ruling, as well as the 
proposed Judgment. I have also reviewed the Defendant, Brighton Title Company, LLC's 
Second Objection to Ruling, filed March 6, 2009. The objection is based upon the minute 
entry dated February 19, 2009, which clarified the earlier summary judgment ruling. The 
Plaintiff's proposed Ruling sets forth, in substantial detail, the undisputed facts upon which 
the Court relied, as well as the legal bases for the granting of summary judgment to 
Plaintiff. Though it was not requested by the Court, it is accurate and consistent with the 
Court's ruling. Therefore, I have signed it, as well as the proposed Judgment, on this date. 
Dated this / (f day of March, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: ADAM L CRAYK 525 S 300 EAST STE 200 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
MAIL: SAMANTHA J SLARK 50 W BROADWAY STE 700 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101 
MAIL: SCOTT R WANGSGARD 57 W 2 00 S STE 4 00 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
8 4 1 0 1 
Date: JT^r-cJn )U (XtWt WjQ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
S.R.WANGSGARD, LC 
Scott R. Wangsgard, #3376 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 578-3510 
Facsimile: (801)578-3531 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., a Utah ; 
professional corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC; ; 
a Utah limited liability company; ] 
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; and ] 
Does 1-10, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
) DEFENDANT BRIGHTON TITLE 
) COMPANY'S COUNTERMOTION 
> FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 070913234 
) Judge Peuler 
Plaintiff Cooper Enterprises, P.C.'s ("Cooper Enterprises") Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Brighton Title Company, LLC's ("Brighton Title") Countermotion for Summary Judgment 
having been submitted for decision by Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision, dated December 8, 
2008. The Court reviewed all of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, discovery responses 
and deposition excerpts submitted in conjunction therewith. The Court carefully reviewed the law 
applicable to the various positions of the parties, and having determined that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact in dispute respecting this matter, and that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law, as more fully set forth hereinafter, the Court hereby enters this Ruling on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Brighton Title's Countermotion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
OVERVIEW 
Deseret Sky Development, LLC ("Deseret Sky") did not file an opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Brighton Title's response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment did not contain "a verbatim restatement of each of the moving parties facts that is 
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controverted" as provided by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Brighton Title 
has admitted in a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's Minute Entry Granting 
Summary Judgment, filed with the Court, dated January 13, 2009, that Plaintiffs statements of 
undisputed facts are uncontro verted. The Court further determined under Rule 7(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that the issues raised in this matter have been authoritatively decided, and that oral 
argument would not be of assistance in the Court making its ruling on this matter. 
This matter involves the claims of Cooper Enterprises, as Sellers, against Deseret Sky, as 
Purchaser, and Brighton Title, as escrow holder, respecting claims for liquidated damages as 
provided in a Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"). The purchase price for the land 
which is the subject matter hereof was $7,500,000.00, with an initial $100,000.00 in earnest money 
to be deposited with Brighton Title. An additional $100,000.00 in earnest money was also due from 
Deseret Sky at expiration of the diligence period. All of the earnest money was to become non-
refundable and delivered to Cooper Enterprises unless the contract wa$ cancelled or objection made 
regarding Deseret Sky's diligence investigations. 
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Neither objection nor cancellation was provided by Deseret Sky to Cooper Enterprises within 
the diligence period provided by the terms of the REPC. Nevertheless, contrary to the terms of the 
REPC, after the expiration of the diligence period, Brighton Title returned to Deseret Sky the initial 
$100,000.00 earnest money deposit it was holding in escrow. 
Cooper Enterprises claims that Deseret Sky is liable to it in the principal amount of 
$200,000.00, representing the initial earnest money deposit of $100,000.00, plus the additional 
deposit required by the REPC of $100,000.00, for a total of $200,000.00, and that Brighton Title is 
liable to Cooper Enterprises in the amount of $100,000.00 for misapplying the earnest monies 
deposited with it into escrow. 
Deseret Sky has failed to respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, but 
essentially contends in its Answer and Counterclaim that it is not liable, even though it did not 
properly object or terminate the contract timely, because Cooper Enterprises did not hold fee title to 
the property at the time the REPC was entered into. However, Cooper Enterprises was under 
contract to purchase the real property from W.H. Hansen Investments, LC (the "Hansen Contract") 
and could, thereafter, transfer title to Deseret Sky. 
Brighton Title claims it is not liable to Cooper Enterprises was not the fee title holder of the 
property, and because the form of the transaction was prohibited by bulletins issued by the Insurance 
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department. The bulletins relied on by Brighton Title are 
advisory in nature and do not have any legal effect and do not relieve Brighton Title of its obligations 
as escrow agent under the REPC. 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following undisputed material facts are established by the motions, pleadings, supporting 
memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, discovery responses, deposition excerpts and other matters 
submitted to the Court respecting this matter. 
Cooper Enterprises is a Utah professional corporation in good standing, doing business in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Deseret Sky is a Utah limited liability company in good standing, doing business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
Brighton Title is a Utah limited Liability company in good standing, doing business in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
The real property which is the subject hereof is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and known generally as Danish Heights Estates PUD or 2745 East Creek Road, Cottonwood Heights, 
Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Real Property"). 
By Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land, with offer reference date of May 25, 2007, as 
modified by Addendum Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the "REPC"), Cooper Enterprises agreed to sell, and 
Deseret Sky agreed to buy the Real Property. 
At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper Enterprises had a contractual right to 
purchase the Real Property by virtue of the Hansen Contract. 
Angela Gowans was at all relevant times a real estate agent employed by Great American 
Properties, whose principal broker is Wes Williams. 
At all relevant times, Angela Gowans was Deseret Sky's agent for purposes of the REPC. 
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On May 27, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper Enterprises a conditional use 
application, preliminary plat submittal which included all applications, title materials, and 
geotechnical information, drawings and engineering information, along with the Cottonwood Heights 
Preliminary Plat Approval, Application Acceptance Letter, Fencing Proposal, Permit Report, 
correspondence with Cottonwood Heights City, sellers disclosures, and minutes from the 
Cottonwood Heights Improvement District pertaining to the Real Property also known as Danish 
Heights project. 
On or about June 1, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper Enterprises the Hansen 
Contract (showing Cooper Enterprises' contract interest for purchase of the Real Property). 
Angela Gowans had "a dozen" conversations with Deseret Sky representatives and 
representatives of Brighton Title in subsequent days respecting the subject of the materials Cooper 
Enterprises provided and the fact that Cooper Enterprises, P.C. did not hold fee title to the Real 
Property. 
Additionally, on May 31, 2007, Brighton Title was aware that Cooper Enterprises did not 
hold fee title to the Real Property. 
The next day, June 1, 2007, Brighton Title so informed Deseret Sky. 
The REPC, paragraph 2(a) reflected an initial earnest money deposit of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), and provided: 'THIS DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY 
NON-REFUNDABLE". 
Paragraph 2 of Addendum No. 1 to the REPC provided: 
2) Earnest Money to be $100,000 deposited w/ Brighton Title Company 
upon acceptance. An additional $100,000 earnest money to be deposited with 
Brighton Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence deadline. Total of $200,000 
shall [be] non-refundable after June 8. 2007. 
Addendum No. 2 to the REPC provides: 
1. REPC, Section 2(d) $ 100,000 additional earnest money due on June 8, 
2007 by 5:00 PMMDT.. . 
* * * 
6. [sic] $100,000 Earnest Money to be non-refundable but applicable and 
immediately released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MDT. 
6. An additional $100,000 Earnest Money will be deposited on June 8, 
2007 by 5:00 pm MDT which is non-refundable but applicable and immediately 
released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MDT. 
Addendum No. 3 provides: 
4) All earnest monies shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and 
shall be released to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MST. 
Under the terms of the REPC, $ 100,000 was deposited with Brighton Title, as evidenced by letter of 
receipt by Brighton Title ("Letter Receipt"), dated June 5, 2007, over the signature of Jeff Gorringe. 
Brighton Title accepted the initial $ 100,000 earnest money frdm Deseret Sky in escrow, in its 
capacity as an escrow agent under the REPC. 
Paragraph 8 of the REPC provides: 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE 
DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this Contract (check applicable 
boxes): 
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval'of the content of all the 
Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7; 
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical cpndition 
inspection of the Property; 
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(c) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the 
Property by a licensed surveyor; 
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of applicable federal, 
state and local governmental laws, ordinances and regulations affecting the Property; 
and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenants, conditions and 
restrictions) affecting the Property; 
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not less than 
the Purchase Price; 
(f) [Xj IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the terms and 
conditions of any mortgage financing referenced in Section 2 above; 
(g) [X| IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests 
and evaluations of the Property: (specify) Any additional deemed necessary by 
Buyer. 
If any of items 8(a) through 8(g) are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 
8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. The items checked in the 
affirmative above are collectively referred to as Buyer's "Due Diligence.". . . 
Paragraph 8.1 of the REPC provides: 
Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of Buyer's Due Diligence; and 
(b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer. 
In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies ($200,000 total) become non-refundable on 
June 8, 2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Sky. In that regard, the REPC 
provides: 
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of 
Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the Due Diligence 
Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide 
Seller with written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence 
Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or 
(b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, the 
Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer and the contingencies 
referenced in Sections 8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing 
contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer. 
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Paragraph 24 of the REPC provided for a Due Diligence Deadline of June 8, 2007. 
The REPC provides, in paragraph 16: 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to . . . retain the 
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. . . . 
The REPC provides, in paragraph 17: 
17. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation . . . to 
enforce this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees. . . . 
The earnest money for the transaction at issue was on deposit with Brighton Title on June 5, 
2007, despite the fact that since on or about May 27, 2007, and at the latest June 1, 2007, Deseret 
Sky and Brighton Title knew that Cooper wasn't the holder of fee title to the property. 
Deseret Sky neither canceled the REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a 
written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence 
Deadline. 
Brighton Title was to receive an additional $100,000 by the end of Deseret Sky's Diligence 
Period, if the REPC wasn't cancelled or objected to by that date. 
The June 8,2007 Due Diligence Deadline came and went without Deseret Sky depositing an 
additional $100,000.00. 
On June 11,2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter (back-dated to June 8,2007) to Robert Cooper of 
Cooper Enterprises ostensibly terminating the REPC and instructing Brighton Title "to return all 
earnest money deposits to the Buyer." 
On June 12 of 2007 (four days after expiration of the diligence period, without cancellation or 
objection by Deseret Sky), Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Cooper Enterprises that 
Brighton Title was going to release the earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky even though 
Brighton Title was informed that Cooper Enterprises claimed the money. 
By letter dated June 13, 2007, Wayne Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky: 
a. that the $ 100,000 Brighton Title held in escrow were being returned to Deseret Sky; 
b. that (despite the Diligence Period under REPC having expired five days prior (i.e., 
June 8, 2007), Brighton Title held out hope of "completing] this transaction." 
None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro National Title, but was instead 
released back to Deseret Sky even though Brighton Title was aware of Cooper Enterprises' claim to 
the deposit. 
Even after the RECP June 8, 2007 Diligence Period had expired, Deseret Sky was still in 
discussions with Cooper Enterprises concerning the potential of having a new contract for the 
property. These discussions continued for almost a month and a half after the Diligence Period 
expired. 
As a result of Deseret Sky's default of its obligations under the REPC, no sale was 
transacted and Cooper Enterprises was unable to purchase the Real Property under the Hansen 
Contract, causing Cooper Enterprises to suffer an actual loss of $1,034,666.66 profit and to forfeit 
the $100,000 that Cooper Enterprises had deposited in accordance with the Hansen Contract to 
acquire the Real Property (which would then, in turn, be sold and conveyed to Deseret Sky). 
Cooper Enterprises elected to accept the earnest money as liquidated damages for Deseret 
Sky's default. 
Cooper Enterprises made demand on Deseret Sky for payment of $200,000 as earnest money 
deposit, and liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Deseret Sky has failed and 
refused to pay. 
Cooper Enterprises made demand on Brighton Title for payment of the $100,000 initial 
earnest money deposit, as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Brighton Title has 
failed and refused to pay. 
Cooper Enterprises has retained the services of an attorney to eniorce its rights and is entitled 
to an award of the attorney's fees and costs pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REPC. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Standards governing the granting of summary judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law {Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred, 182 P.3d 
337 (Utah 2008) (citing Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P.). As required by iaw, the court has viewed all 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but has not assumed facts for 
which no evidence is offered. Id. (citingPeterson v. Coca-Cola USA\ 9.002 UT 42, ^  20,48 P.3d 941 
(Utah 2002)). 
Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly before the court are to be 
construed in favor of the opponent on a motion of summary judgmerit, the mere existence of issues 
of fact does not preclude summary judgment. The issues of fact must be material to the applicable 
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rule of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) {citing Morgan v Industrial Design 
Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982) (mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole 
does not preclude entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the 
case); Heglar Ranch, Inc v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment not precluded 
simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely 
controverted); see also F. M A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670 (Utah 1965) (mere 
dispute as to some question of fact does not preclude granting of summary judgment, as issue in 
dispute must be one which is material in the sense that resolving it is necessary to determine legal 
rights of parties). 
As noted above, Deseret Sky has wholly failed to respond to Cooper Enterprises' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Brighton Title has admitted that each of Plaintiffs facts that ]s 
uncontroverted. Thus, the facts as stated by Plaintiff Cooper Enterprises in its Motion for Summaiy 
Judgment are deemed admitted. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court has carefully reviewed all of the materials and 
pleadings submitted by the parties in this matter in making its ruling. 
The undisputed, material facts of the instant case show that Plaintiff is entitled to summaiy 
judgment against the Defendants as a matter of law. 
Seller need not have title at all times during the executory period of a contract 
Deseret Sky, in its answer and counterclaim, and Brighton Title contend that they are not 
liable to Cooper Enterprises because Cooper Enterprises misrepresented itself as the owner of the 
Real Property because Cooper Enterprises did not hold fee title to the Real Property when the parties 
entered into the REPC. Defendants' contention is demonstrably erroneous. 
Prior to the parties entering into the REPC, Cooper Enterprises was under contract with WH 
Hansen Investments, LC to purchase the Real Property and, therefore, held equitable title to the Real 
Property. Significantly, Deseret Sky and Brighton Title were on notice of this fact before the initial 
earnest money $100,000.00 was deposited with Brighton Title, and well before June 8,2007, which 
date was Deseret Sky's Due Diligence Deadline. 
Equitable title is, by definition, "a title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and that 
gives the holder the right to acquire formal legal title." (Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).) 
Cooper Enterprises thus held equitable title to the property at the time it entered into the REPC with 
Deseret Sky. Cooper Enterprises correctly claimed—and represented itself as holding—an 
ownership interest in the Real Property; moreover, Deseret Sky and Brighton Title had actual notice 
of the nature of Cooper's title before the initial deposit was acknowledged, and before expiration of 
the Due Diligence Deadline. 
Brighton Title and Deseret Sky's actual knowledge of Cooper's equitable title status 
notwithstanding, Deseret Sky contends in its answer and counterclaim that Cooper Enterprises' 
failure to disclose its lack of fee title at the time the REPC was entered into constituted a fraud which 
entitled Deseret Sky to rescind the REPC. Brighton Title contends the REPC was unenforceable and 
it was, therefore, entitled to refund to Deseret Sky the earnest money. This very issue was expressly 
addressed in the Utah Supreme Court case of Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah, 1981). The 
Neves court held that a seller under a uniform real estate contract that represents itself as having title 
need not have marketable title until final payment is made or tendered. The Neves court further 
observed, inter alia: 
[As early as 1909, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909) the Utah 
Supreme Court] established the fundamental rule that a seller need not have legal 
title during the entire executory period of a real estate contract. 
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d at 1197. 
In Owens v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 580, 221 P. 160 (1923), the seller, at the time the 
contract was entered into, did not have legal title to the land. His cousin, who had a 
claim against the land for $1,277.75 as part of the seller's purchase price, held legal 
title. About the time an action was commenced by the buyer, the seller's cousin 
conveyed legal title to the seller, enabling him to convey good title prior to the time 
established in the contract. The Court held that the purchaser was not entitled to 
rescission and recovery of the purchase price. 
Id. at 1198 (citing Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973); Woodard v. 
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953)). 
The court in Neves continued: 
This Court reiterated the basic principle in Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 223, 
357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1960): 
[T]he vendor in a real estate contract is generally not obliged to have 
full and clear marketable title at all times during the pendency of his 
contract of sale because, ordinarily, title need not be conveyed until 
the final payment is made or tendered; and we further agree that the 
purchaser cannot use a claimed deficiency in title as an excuse for 
refusing to keep a commitment to purchase property, as was 
attempted in the case of Woodard v. Allen, (1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 
398 (1953).) (Footnotes omitted.) 
Id. 
The Neves court went on to explain: 
The rule that a seller of real estate need not have title at all times during the 
executory period of a contract, is not designed to favor sellers over buyers; rather, 
the purpose is to enhance the alienability of real estate by providing necessary 
flexibility in real estate transactions. 
* * * 
The basic test in determining whether a buyer can rescind is whether the defect, by 
its nature, is one that can be removed, as a practical matter, as distinguished from 
defects which, by their nature, cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter. 
Davis v. Dean Vincent Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702 (1970). 
Id. at 1199. 
Deseret Sky was fully advised of Cooper's interest in the Real Property during the Diligence 
Period and still did not cancel or object as allowed by the REPC. Deseret Sky was provided a title 
commitment showing Cooper as purchaser, and also was given a copy of the Hansen Contract. Well 
before the expiration of the Diligence Period, Deseret Sky knew that title would pass from W. H. 
Hansen to Cooper, and then to Deseret Sky. 
Deseret Sky has waived any potential breach of contract claim against Cooper 
Even if any of Cooper's disclosures were considered somehow to constitute 
misrepresentations, Deseret Sky cannot claim such as a defense to its breach of contact, nor claim 
breach of contract on the part of Cooper: 
[I]f the party to whom a misrepresentation has been made, after having ascertained 
the real facts of the case, and thus discovered the untruth of the statements, goes on 
acting in pursuance of the contract, . . . he thereby waives the benefit of the 
misrepresentations, and cannot allege them as a ground either for rescinding or 
resisting enforcement of the agreement. In other words, the party who has been 
misled is required, as soon as he learns the truth and discovers the falsity of the 
statements on which he relied, with all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the contract, 
and give the other party an opportunity of rescinding it, and of restoring both of them 
to their original position. The party deceived is not allowed to go on deriving all 
possible benefit from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved from his own 
obligations by a rescission or a refusal to execute. 
Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 109 P. 2, 7 (Utah 1910). 
Accordingly, Deseret Sky's and Brighton Title's defense to Cooper Enterprises' claims (for 
liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC) based upon a lack of title and/or other 
misrepresentation is without merit as a matter of law. By the same token, the Le Vine v. Whitehouse 
holding (and the Kenny v. Rich holding cited in the next paragraph infra) dictates that Defendants 
cannot assert against Cooper a claim for breach of contract that Deseret Sky itself has, by its inaction, 
waived. 
Deseret Sky's failure to elect to cancel the REPC before the Due Diligence Deadline 
Deseret Sky neither canceled the REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a 
written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence 
Deadline. Paragraph 8.3 of the REPC prescribes the consequence of Deseret Sky's inaction: 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, Buyer 
does not: (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written 
objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's Due Diligence 
shall be deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections 
8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing contingency, shall be 
deemed waived by Buyer. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The guiding legal principles with respect to Deseret Sky's failure to timely cancel or object were 
recently discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008). 
In discussing this principle, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Where a party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and timeline in 
order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the party 
waives his or her rights. See Brinton v IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966 (Utah 
1998) ("[T]he trial court correctly required [the party] to timely assert each objection 
to purported . . . violations of the [contract], in compliance with his contractually 
assumed duty, or relinquish them [as waived]."); see also DCM Inv. Corp. v. 
Pinecrest Inv. Co , 34 P.3d 785 (Utah 2001) ("[Defendants] failure to choose either 
option [as required by the contract] resulted in waiver of its contractual right to select 
an option."); American Rural Cellular v. Systems Commc 'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185,193 
(Utah App. 1997). 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589, 599 
(Utah 2003) (citing Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah App.1994). "Waiver of a 
contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its 
contractual rights." "[The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied." Id The procedures set out for cancellation or objection set forth in the REPC are clear 
and unequivocal. Deseret Sky had until June 8, 2007, to exercise its rights to object and/or cancel 
the REPC. Having failed to do so, Deseret Sky relinquished and waived its right to rescind the 
REPC. Deseret Sky is now barred from belatedly claiming either a right of rescission or a claim of 
breach against Cooper. 
Because Deseret Sky did not timely cancel the transaction, in accordance with the terms of 
the REPC, the earnest monies ($200,000 total) have become non-refundable and payable to Cooper 
Enterprises as liquidated damages. 
Deseret Sky has waived any right to rescind based on a theory of fraud 
As of the June 8,2007 Due Diligence Deadline Deseret Sky had neither canceled the REPC 
by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's 
Due Diligence. Nevertheless, for more than a month and a half after the Diligence Deadline, Deseret 
Sky continued to communicate with Cooper in the hope it might still consummate a sale of the Real 
Property. At no time during these continued contacts and discussions did Deseret Sky either assert to 
Cooper Enterprises that it was defrauded or that it claimed a right of cancellation based upon any 
misrepresentation. 
It is well settled by decisions from [the Utah Supreme Court] court that a person 
claiming the right to rescind a contract because of misrepresentations or fraud, must, 
after discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose [to rescind] anc} adhere to it. 
Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 844 (Utah 1949) (citing Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 
493,51 P.2d222). 
Deseret Sky cannot claim on the one hand that it was defrauded, yet having discovered the 
ostensible misrepresentation, continue under such circumstances to pursue an interest in the REPC. 
If it considered itself defrauded, Deseret Sky's right was to cancel or object. Deseret Sky did neither, 
and it cannot now belatedly claim the right to rescind. Consequently, Deseret Sky's defense to 
Cooper Enterprises' claims and Deseret Sky's counterclaim on the basis of "'fraud'* is without merit 
as a matter of law. 
Deseret Sky's default 
Under the terms of the REPC, Deseret Sky made an initial $100,000 earnest money deposit 
with Brighton Title, as evidenced by the "Letter of receipt" by Brighton Title, dated June 5, 2007, 
over the signature of Jeff Gorringe. Deseret Sky never made the second $100,000 earnest money 
deposit and is thus in default of the REPC, making it liable to Cooper for liquidated damages of 
$200,000. Additionally and tellingly, on June 11,2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter (back-dated to June 
8, 2007) via facsimile to Robert Cooper, one of the principals of Cooper Enterprises, whereby 
Deseret Sky advised Cooper Enterprises that it was cancelling the contract in accordance with 
Section 8.2 of the REPC. This back-dated letter makes clear that Deseret Sky was aware that if it 
wished to cancel the contract, it must have done so prior to close of business on June 8, 2007. 
Deseret Sky has breached the contract in two distinct ways: (1) by failing to make the second 
$100,000 Earnesl Money Deposit, and (2) by repudiating its obligations under the contract in writing, 
with a bogus back-dated cancellation letter. 
Liquidated damages 
Where the parties to a contract stipulate to the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid 
in case of a breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not 
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained Perkins v Spencer, 243 P 2d 446, 449 (Utah 
1952) (citing Bramwell Inv Co v Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P 2d 913, 916) In the instant case the 
amount of forfeiture involved is $200,000 on a contract of $7,500,000, from which Cooper 
Enterprises would have profited in the amount of approximately $1,000,000 In fact, Cooper 
Enterprises ended up losing not only its expected profit, but forfeited to its Seller, W H Hansen, a 
$100,000 earnest money deposit of its own, thus the liquidated damages are not greatly 
disproportionate to the actual damage and much less than actually suffered by Cooper Enterprises 
See Reliance Ins Co v Utah Dept of Transp , 858 P 2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993) 
On the issue of liquidated damages, Brighton Title appears to argue that Cooper Enterprises 
cannot claim liquidated damages because its damages "aie not difficult to calculate," in light of 
"Cooper's calculation of the damages to the very last dollar " Oddly, Brighton's argument is that 
because Cooper Enterprises' actual damages indisputably exceeded the liquidated damages provided 
in the REPC, Cooper Enterprises is somehow barred from electing to claim liquidated damages As 
a matter of contractual right, Cooper Enterprises was entitled to the earnest money as liquidated 
damages upon its election following breach of the REPC l There is no authority for the proposition 
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 A provision for liquidated damages is generally enforceable, the same as the other terms of a contract, [unless] the 
damages thus stipulated are so excessive that they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered, [in 
which case] it would be unconscionable to give it effect, [and] the court will regard it as a penalty and refuse to enforce it 
Young Elec Sign Co v Vetas, 564 P 2d 758, 760 (Utah, 1977), Foote v Taylor, 635 P 2d 46 49 (Utah, 1981) (If a 
provision in a contract provides for liquidated damages which are so grossly excessive in comparison to actual damage 
suffered that it is unconscionable, the court will not enforce it), Andreasen v Hansen, 335 P 2d 404,407 (Utah, 1959) (It 
is true that provisions for 'stipulated' or 'liquidated7 damages in cases of breach of contract have sometimes prescribed 
forfeiture of amounts so grossly disproportionate to any actual damage that to enforce the provision would shock the 
conscience In such instances, the courts, invoking their powers of equity, refuse to enforce such penalties In that 
connection however, it is to be kept firmly m mmd, that the courts recognize the rights of parties freely to contract and 
are extremely reluctant to do anything which will fail to give full recognition to such nghts), Robbins v Finlay, 645 P 2d 
623,625 - 26 (Utah, 1982) (Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable if designed to provide fair compensation for 
a breach based on a reasonable relation to actual damages (citing Young Electric Sign Co v Vetas, Utah, 564 P 2d 758, 
760(1977)) 
that a plaintiff must forego liquidated damages when damages are "easily calculated" after the fact 
and actual damages exceed the liquidated damages provision of the breached contract. 
Brighton Title's liability for failure to uphold its duties as escrow agent 
Upon the performance of the condition or the happening of the event stipulated in the escrow 
agreement, it is the duty of the depositary to deliver what is deposited in the escrow, and the 
depositary, being as much the agent of the grantor as of the grantee, is as much bound to deliver on 
the performance of the specified condition or the happening of the specified event as he or she is 
bound to withhold until the performance or the happening of the event (see, e g , 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Escrow § 28). 
Brighton Title accepted the initial $ 100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, in its 
capacity as an escrow agent. Brighton Title was to receive $200,000 by the end of Deseret Sky's 
Diligence Period, if the contract wasn't cancelled or objected to by that date. At the end of the 
Diligence Period, if the contract wasn't cancelled or objected to, the earnest money was to be 
forwarded to Metro National Title. None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro 
National Title, but was instead released back to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title disbursed the initial 
$100,000 earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky in default of its obligations to Cooper Enterprises. 
Section 7-22-108 of the Utah Code provides for an escrow agent's duties as follows: 
(2) All other assets or property received by an escrow agent in accordance 
with an escrow agreement shall be maintained in a manner which will reasonably 
preserve and protect the property from loss, theft, or damage, and which will 
otherwise comply with all duties and responsibilities of a fiduciary or bailee 
generally. 
Brighton Title accepted the earnest money and agreed to serve as the escrow agent for the REPC 
transaction Rriahton Title chose to act as it did. When there are conflicting claims to the fund held 
by the escrow agent, the agent is neither required nor permitted to make its own determination as to 
the rights of the rival claimants, but may rely upon any applicable contractual provisions in refusing 
to deliver the documents to either party and cannot be held liable for exercising its right to refuse 
delivery, or can seek a judicial determination by interpleader of the entitlement of the parties. 28 
Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 28. 
When the Diligence Period expired without objection or cancellation, Brighton Title had 
three rightful options with respect to the disposition of the earnest money that it held on deposit. 
First, hold the money pending an agreement between the parties to the REPC; second, to forward the 
money on to Metro National Title, as required by the terms of the REPC; or third, interplead the 
funds, as allowed by Rule 22, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Brighton Title chose a fourth 
path of wrongfully returning the initial earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title is thus 
liable to Cooper Enterprises for the amount of the initial deposit. 
Brighton Title's liability is established by black letter law: 'Title companies will be liable for 
improper disbursement of funds they hold in escrow" (2 Title Insurance Law § 20:7. Title companies' 
duties as escrow and closing agents—handling funds). 
It is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the agent of both 
parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard of care in 
dealing with its principals. 
Freegardv. First WesternNat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (citing National Bank v. Equity 
Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973)2; see also Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252, 
2
 See Schoepe v. Zions First National Bank, 750 F.Supp. 1084, at 1086-87 and n.4 CD. Utah 1990), where it discussed 
''Utah Case Law on Escrow Agency": 
In reversing the trial court in Freegard v First Western Nafl Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action against the escrow agent based upon the fiduciary duty 
20 
257, 112 P.2d 153, 155; cert. denied,3\4 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 361, 86 L.Ed. 472 (1941); see also 28 
Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 26. Depositary is a fiduciary)). Deviation from those terms without the mutual 
consent of the parties concerned will subject the agent to liability for damages caused by his 
departure. Miller v. Craig, 558 P.2d 984 (Ariz. App. 1976).3 
Bulletin issued by the Utah Department of Insurance does not have the force of law 
Brighton Title argues that the transaction contemplated by the REPC was illegal and thus 
void. In support of this contention, however, Brighton Title cites to no binding law that the REPC 
allegedly violated, and Brighton Title's argument that the REPC violated "the law" as stated in a 
Utah State Department of Insurance "Bulletin 2007-1" (pertaining to prohibit so-called "flip 
transactions") is an erroneous conclusion based upon a false premise. Brighton Title itself correctly 
stops short of claiming that Bulletin 2007-1 has the force of law because (as is shown infra) Bulletin 
2007-1 does not. Brighton Title correctly states, "Admittedly, the Bulletin [2007-1] is interpretative 
the agent owed to its principal. In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval National Bank v. Equity 
Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886,910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973). National Bank held that an escrow agent's duties are defined by 
the escrow instructions and that the agent becomes liable to its principals for damage resulting from breach of the 
instructions or from exceeding authority conferred by the instructions. See 506 P.2d at 35: 
An escrow holder is an agent. Whether he be designated escrow agent or escrow holder, or both, 
makes little difference in law; the important thing is that as an agent, holder, or trustee for the parties, 
he occupies a fiduciary relationship to all parties to the escrow. As an agent, trustee or holder, the 
escrow holder owes a fiduciary duty to his principals in the same way that all agents are held to such 
standards. 
J
 See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 46. Actions at law; election of remedies: 
In addition to equitable remedies, actions at law are maintainable for money damages against the 
depositary when he or she fails to comply with the agreement or breaches his or her duties thereunder, 
as by refusing to deliver the escrowed item as required by the agreement. Id. 
30A C.J.S. Escrows § 18. Liabilities. A depositary is liable for a breach of the duties assumed by him or her under the 
terms of the escrow contract. If the depositary deviates from the terms of the escrow agreement without the mutual 
consent of the parties concerned, violates duties assumed under the terms of the escrow contract or instructions, or 
breaches fiduciary duties the depositary is liable in damages for the loss suffered thereby. 
and therefore this Court need not give deference to the interpretation set forth in Bulletin 2007-1 " 
To issue a mandatory or enforceable "rule", the Utah Department of Insurance must comply with 
particular processes prescribed by statute. See, generally, §§31A-2-101, e/seg. and §§63-46a-l, et 
seq. (renumbered by Laws 2008 and now appearing at §§63G-3-101, et seq.). 
The Affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, attorney and former Assistant Commissioner of the 
Utah Department of Insurance, in paragraph 6 (filed as Exhibit "H" to Brighton Title's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment) makes clear that these "Bulletins do not 
have the force of law and cannot be violated per se". Thus, unless Brighton Title can show a 
violation of the underlying statute, § 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Ann., which the bulletin attempts to 
interpret, there is no legal basis to its claim. 
Otherwise stated, any argument that Bulletin 2007-1 carries the force of law is patently 
erroneous. Notwithstanding that Brighton Title cannot claim the REPC "violated" the non-law that 
is Bulletin 2007-1, Brighton Title nevertheless gratuitously concludes, without analysis, that Bulletin 
2007-1 "recognized the transaction as a violation of Utah's good funds statute," but this argument 
too is patently erroneous. 
When Brighton Title's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Jeffrey Gorringe, was specifically examined 
concerning whether or not the transaction contemplated in this matter violated any provision of the 
so-called good funds statute, he responded as follows: 
Q. So, every one of those requirements was met in this transaction. There's 
nothing in this—these sections that prohibit this transaction. Right? 
A. Right. 
* * * 
Q. And Cooper then - within this section, could have simultaneously, upon 
receipt of wired funds or cash, distributed that money to Hansen, to pay the Hansen 
contract. Correct? 
It all could have been done the same day? 
A. It all could have been done simultaneously. 
* * * 
Q. Is there anything that you see in the Code sections that are cited here [§31A-
23a-406] . . . that would have been violated by the transaction we are talking about 
here today. 
A. No. 
Brighton's "split escrow" argument that cites to § 31 A-23a-406 and Bulletin 2007-5 is but 
another of many red herrings Brighton Title throws in the path of a straightforward analysis. Bulletin 
2007-5, like Bulletin 2007-1, is merely interpretive and does not carry the force of law. Moreover, 
Bulletin 2007-5, like Bulletin 2007-1, is interpretive of the good funds statute, § 31 A-23a-406, and 
as noted above, when Brighton Title's 30(b)(6) witness was questioned regarding whether or not the 
facts of this transaction actually violated any of the provisions of the good funds statute, he 
responded in the negative. Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties 
when—and because—it accepted and acted in its capacity as escrow agent. It did not have the 
option, much less the "legal" obligation, to violate its contractual duties; instead it should have held 
the funds pending an agreement between the parties, interpleaded the escrowed funds or complied 
with the contractual terms that governed it. 
Cooper Enterprises was entitled to the earnest money as liquidated damages upon its election, 
and upon Deseret Sky's breach of the REPC. Regarding the earnest money deposit, Brighton Title 
owed to Cooper Enterprises a fiduciary duty as a trustee not to disburse the earnest money deposited 
with it, except to fulfill the terms of the individual escrow, in this case the terms of the REPC, for 
which the funds were accepted, and not to use the earnest money for any other purpose until all 
conditions of the escrow, in this case the REPC, had been met. 
CONCLUSION 
• The counter claims of Defendant Deseret Sky must be dismissed; and 
• Defendants owe, and Plaintiff is entitled to, judgment in the principal amount of 
$200,000.00, plus interest, from Deseret Sky as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, 
with Brighton Title to be jointly and severally liable for $100,000 plus interest on such amount. 
Interest is calculated at ten percent (10%) per annum from June 9, 2007, until date of judgment in 
accordance with § 15-1-1, of the Utah Code Ann., with interest thereafter at the judgment rate of 
2.40%. Brighton Title is jointly and severally liable with Deseret Sky for Plaintiff's awardable costs. 
Deseret Sky is liable for Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs in accordance with the terms of the 
REPC to be established in accordance with Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated: jjfltlary Ho , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
4
 "When a person acts as the depositary of an escrow, he or she is absolutely bound by the terms and conditions of the 
deposit and charged with the strict execution of the duties thereby voluntarily assumed." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 24. 
"Since the escrow holder has no personal interest in the escrow deposit other than carrying out his or her obligations 
under the escrow agreement, he or she must be impartial in his or her dealings with both the depositor and the 
beneficiary." Id. 
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Samantha J. Slark 
Attorneys for Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLC 
Adam L. Crayk 
Attorney for Defendant Brighton Title Company, LLC 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C , a Utah ; 
professional corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC; ; 
a Utah limited liability company; ] 
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; and ] 
Does 1-10, ; 
Defendants. 
) NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
) DECISION 
) (Oral Argument Requested) 
) Civil No. 070913234 
) Judge Peuler 
The following issues are ready for decision by the Court. The documents indicated have 
been filed with the Court. 
1. (a) Type of Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Request for Hearing 
(b) Date served: October 20,2008 
(c) Party filing: Plaintiff 
X Memorandum in Support 
08 DEC - 9 AM II- 2 9 
X Affidavits in Support 
_X Memorandum in Opposition 
_X Affidavits in Opposition 
_X Memorandum in Reply 
Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
2. (a) Type of Motion: Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment 
(b) Date served: October 31,2008 
(c) Party filing: Defendant Brighton Title Company, LLC 
X Memorandum in Support 
X Affidavits in Support 
X Memorandum in Opposition 
Affidavit in Opposition 
X Memorandum in Reply 
Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
3. Plaintiff requests this matter be set for oral argument. 
Dated: December j j ,2008. 
S.R. WANGSGARD, LC 
Scott R. Wangsgard 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
S.R.WANGSGARD, LC 
Scott R. Wangsgard, #3376 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 578-3510 
Facsimile: (801)578-3531 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., a Utah ; 
professional corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC; ; 
a Utah limited liability company; ] 
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; and ] 
Does 1-10, ; 
Defendants. 
) AMENDED NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
) FOR DECISION 
) Civil No. 070913234 
) Judge Penlfir 
The following issue is ready for decision by the Court. The documents indicated have 
been filed with the Court. 
1. (a) Type of document: (A) RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT 
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY'S 
COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; and] 
(B) JUDGMENT 
(b) Date served: January 15,2009 
09 FEB - 2 : A.: U - 0& 
(c) Party filing: Plaintiff 
Memorandum in Support 
Affidavit in Support 
_X Memorandum in Opposition: 
(A) Brighton Title's Objection to Plaintiffs Draft of 
"Judgment"; 
(B) Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of 
Court's Minute Entry Granting Summary 
Judgment; 
(C) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Brighton Title Company, LLC's Motion 
for Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's 
Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment; and 
(D) Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's 
Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment 
Affidavit in Opposition 
Memorandum in Reply 
JX Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(A) Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
(B) Objection to Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs; 
and 
(C) Reply to Objection to Affidavit of Attorneys Fees 
and Costs 
Dated: January _ 2 3 _ , 2009. 
S.R. WANGSGARD, LC 
:L. 
Scott R^Wangs^urd 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the djil*. ^ °f January= 2009,1 caused to be served, via United 
States First-Class Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE TO 
SUBMIT FOR DECISION to: 
Steven W. Dougherty 
Samantha J. Slark 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLU 
Douglas L. Stowell 
Adam L. Crayk 
STOWELL LAW, PLLC 
525 South 300 East. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant Brighton Title Company, LtC 
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DOUGLAS L STOWELL 
STOVvELL & CPAYK LAW, L LLC 
525 S 300 L STE 20C 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84 111 
Snshrr 
Suahre 
Snsftrr 
RE Coper Enterprises v Deseret Sky Appellate Case No 2009CL09 
Dear Counsel 
Dlease be dQvised that the Notice 01 Appeal m this case was 
filed m the Utah Court of Appeals Pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and 
78^-4-103, Utah Cooe ^rpo^cleo, t^e cppea. nas oee^ transferred 
to the Utah Supreme Co^rt oecause it is taren from an older or 
judgment of a court ±r a case that is not within the original 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals Tne case number is 
20090209 end shoula be indicated on iutjre i m n u b d~d 
correspondence 
Included with this notice is an order transferring the case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals within twenty days The order remains 
m effect, unless, within 10 calendar days of the date of the 
order letters are received advising the Supreme Court why they 
should retain the case 
Rule 11(e) (1) of the Utah Rales of Appellate Procedure requires 
that, within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal, 
appellant must submit a transcript request for such parts of the 
proceedings as the appellant deems necessary The transcript 
request should be directed to the court executive in the tr_al 
court A copy of tne request should also be mailed to the clerk 
of the appellate cour4" to which tne appeal is taken 
If no tianscripts 01 the proceedmas are to be reouested, 
apoellart must rile a certificate to t^at erfect witft the clerk 
>F UTAH 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
Cooper E n t e r p r i s e s , P . C . , MAR ! I 2009 
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e , 
v . Case No. 20090209-SC 
D e s e r e t Sky Development , LLC; 
B r i g h t o n T i t l e Company, LLC; 
and Does 1-10, 
Defendan t s and A p p e l l a n t 
ORDER 
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
effective twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Thereafter, 
all further pleadings and correspondence should ;be directed to that 
Court. Prior to the effective date of the transfer, this Court is 
willing to consider retaining this matter on its own docket. 
Accordingly, any party to the appeal may submit a letter to the Court 
regarding the appropriateness of retention. The letter shall contain 
the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading 
describing each category: 
1. The name of the case and the appellate case number 
2. The names of all parties involved in the case and the 
attorneys and firms representing the parties. 
3. A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal 
4 . A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or 
transfer. 
The letter shall not exceed five pages and must ^c received within ten 
calendar days of the date of this order. In the event the tenth day 
falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the 
first business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of 
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer. 
Date ' Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATEi 
ooOoc 
mm KsiiiQT ciiif 
Third JudioiE! District 
By. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deoutv Clerk 
m. 
